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The passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 overhauled United States labor law, 
and it shifted the balance of power in favor of organized labor. Seizing upon this monumental 
moment in history, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was founded with a mandate 
to “organize the unorganized”. The labor federation made its primary focus the mass production 
workers of America, many of whom had not previously been afforded the opportunity to join a 
union. This was especially true in the southern United States, where a combination of one-party 
political hegemony, Jim Crow laws which mandated segregation, and the defiance of 
corporations went unmatched in opposition to unionism. Building on a tradition of radical, 
militant activism, the CIO brought mass unionism to the South. Refusing to stop with workers’ 
rights, the federation went further by pushing for civil and political rights for African Americans 
in the South when few dared to challenge the established order which had remained in place 
since Reconstruction. The legacy of the CIO can be traced beyond its southern organizing forays 
to the present day, where the traditions of worker activism continue to make themselves known 
in the present day in fights for equal rights across not only the South but the entire United States 
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George Holloway was born in Memphis in 1915. The years of his childhood comprised 
some of the worst of the Jim Crow Era for an African American boy.1 George grew up in an era 
with segregated schools, restaurants, streetcars, and swimming pools. He learned from his father, 
a Pullman porter, about the importance and value of a union at an early age when he joined the 
Memphis chapter of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, but there were also harsh lessons 
to learn. George learned that even with a union the power of segregation remained unbroken 
since blacks were required to meet separately and had little power over their own affairs; he also 
learned that involving oneself in a union in Memphis was dangerous.2 Edward Crump, the 
notorious political boss who de facto ruled Memphis for decades, was a staunch opponent of 
organized labor. When George was about twelve years old, he along with his father witnessed 
Crump using the power of the police to put labor and civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph on a 
train leaving Memphis before he could finish speaking to his audience.3 Crump and the 
accompanying ruling elite used police power, segregation, threats of being run out of town, poll 
taxes, and even the church to maintain political hegemony over the city. This was the city that 
George Holloway grew up in; it was a city whose leaders were heavily devoted to stopping the 
spread of organized labor and civil rights especially to the majority African American population 
of Memphis. As George himself said, “Until people like me came back from college to take 
positions, that’s just how it worked. I joined the union and all to help change these things.”4  
 
1 Michael K. Honey, Black Workers Remember: An Oral History of Segregation, Unionism, and  
the Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999), 60-61. 
2 Ibid, 60-65.  
3 Ibid, 60-61. 
4 Ibid, 63-66. 
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 George would go on to do exactly what he set out to do. The Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), a rival labor organization to the American Federation of Labor (AFL), set 
about to organize the Firestone plant in Memphis in 1940. George was one of the leaders of the 
organizing drive for the United Rubber Workers (URW) and the CIO. He led biracial marches 
around the plant prior to the beginning of the workday, assisted URW organizer George Bass, 
and ensured black support for the CIO.5 During the organizing drive, Bass and his assistant were 
beaten by a group of men with clubs. Policemen stood by and some even joined in on the brutal 
assault. Holloway was prevented from coming to his friend’s aid since the union men did not 
wish for the incident to become something which could be portrayed as a race riot. Holloway and 
Bass attributed the assault to the orders of Crump due to the lack of police assistance and the 
amount of money which was involved in the planning and execution of the attack.6 George Bass 
continued to promote the CIO despite these attacks. As Holloway said of Bass, “George used to 
tell everyone that the CIO believed in justice for all, and the right to a job. That’s what the CIO 
was built on. Blacks should have as much right to a good job as anyone else, and the company 
shouldn’t be making color division.”7 Holloway was forced to quit his job at Firestone before the 
union vote as he was about to be fired for leading the march at the plant in support of the CIO. 
Adding to the misfortune was the fact that the CIO lost the union vote at Firestone to the AFL 
which was backed by a majority of white workers. Nevertheless, George Holloway would 
receive his long-awaited victory at Firestone. The CIO pursued another organizing drive at the 
plant in 1942. This time, George returned as a poll watcher for the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), and in his own words, “… I bet 99 percent voted CIO.”8  
 
5 Ibid, 69-70. 
6 Ibid, 70-71.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid, 71-72. 
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The CIO brought its radical brand of unionism with it to the South even though the 
obstacles to unionization throughout the region were overwhelming. Their efforts would 
culminate in the CIO’s Southern Organizing Drive, known popularly as Operation Dixie, which 
took place from 1946 to 1953. Operation Dixie and the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
have both been studied at length. Much of the existing historiography relating to Operation 
Dixie, however, has been limited in its scope. While focusing heavily on the textile industry 
where the CIO chose to make its strongest pushes for organization, the fate of many workers and 
unions outside of major textile producing regions is often ignored. Operation Dixie and the CIO 
more generally is also depicted as suffering constant defeats from its inception and being 
subjected to a steady decline which culminates in the dissolution of Operation Dixie and the 
1955 merger of the CIO with the AFL. 
There is much to be explored about this incredibly complex campaign and the CIO 
members behind its planning and execution. The most important element to remember when 
discussing Operation Dixie, one which has often been forgotten, is that the Southern Organizing 
Drive cannot be contained merely by the years of its formal activity. Rather, Operation Dixie 
should be seen as the culmination of a long-term CIO strategy to organize the South. At the 
annual CIO convention held in Detroit in 1941, the following resolution was unanimously passed 
in favor of southern activity:  
Whereas, it having been recognized by this convention that the organization of the workers in the South is 
the No. 1 task before the CIO . . . Resolved, That the officials of the CIO are urged immediately to 
formulate and put into effect plans in conjunction with all interested national and international unions 
designed to bring about the organization of all Southern workers into unions of the CIO.9  
 
9 Michael Goldfield, The Southern Key: Class, Race, and Radicalism in the 1930s and 1940s 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), Oxford Scholarship Online, 2020, 294. 
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Even prior to this resolution, there was significant CIO activity in the South. CIO organizers 
across the region had years to sharpen their techniques, scout the potential challenges, and 
become familiar with the territory they were to organize. Workers in the South responded to the 
CIO and its ideals, and these workers often formed the basis of a grassroots organizing base in 
places such as Birmingham and Memphis. Long before Operation Dixie commenced, these types 
of grassroot movements became commonplace in CIO organizing throughout the South. These 
grassroots activities would become a crucial part of early CIO successes in the South, and the 
implications of this kind of organizing would continue to have a major effect on the CIO through 
Operation Dixie. For these reasons, Operation Dixie should be looked at as if it were the 
culmination of a CIO project spanning decades rather than a one-off push by the union. 
The story of Operation Dixie is made up of much more than defeat and dejection. There 
are many unions that experienced tremendous successes as a result of the CIO’s organizing drive 
such as the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers (FTA), United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA), and the United Auto Workers (UAW) among many others. The CIO leaders 
responsible for the drive saw promise in their efforts; they saw signs that encouraged them to 
continue in their grand campaign to organize the South. These men believed from the outset that 
Operation Dixie would bring success, and there were substantial victories throughout the drive 
which served to reinforce those beliefs. These victories came in many forms: negotiating new 
contracts, organizing new locals, and adding members to the existing unions across the region. 
These are not the only parts of the Southern Organizing Drive which have been largely 
overlooked within the current research. Throughout the CIO’s existence, the organization 
remained committed to combatting injustices. In this capacity, the CIO exhibited wide-ranging 
support for black workers and civil rights unionism within its ranks. The CIO also stood behind 
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female workers and often employed women in roles for the organization including at some of the 
highest levels of the CIO. While these actions in and of themselves may not seem extraordinary, 
these were policies which were decidedly not mainstream during the CIO’s existence. This is 
especially true in the American South, where Jim Crow laws provided a legal basis for the 
separation of the races and cultural norms often relegated women to a lesser role in both single 
and family life. These guiding principles of the CIO have been well established by writers such 
as Robert Korstad, but the radical nature of the CIO and its program of civil rights unionism 
alongside its grassroots organizing strategies had an outsize effect, both positive and negative, on 
CIO activity in the South for its entire existence, including the Southern Organizing Drive.  
There is the question of why the CIO attempted such an ambitious project in the first 
place. Often ignored during this evaluation is the CIO’s wide-ranging activity in the South prior 
to the beginning of Operation Dixie; the union was active for ten years in the region before the 
formal organizing drive. Its organizers and workers had ample time to learn lessons in organizing 
the South, but it is not clear that these lessons were applied to Operation Dixie proper. From its 
beginning, the CIO was founded and governed on the principles of civil rights unionism. As 
these were the organization’s guiding tenets, the motivation to organize laborers in the South 
came not only from practical concerns but also from an ideological basis as the CIO strove to 
support women and African Americans. Much of the CIO’s southern organizing activity was 
driven by this commitment to minorities and women. These ideals found a place in Operation 
Dixie, but ultimately, due to the immense difficulty with confronting the existing order in the 
South, they were expressed in a much different way than they had been by the earlier CIO 
activities in the region.  Additionally, the reasons for the optimism of the CIO regarding the drive 
become much clearer when viewed in the context of the evolving labor movement in the United 
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States from 1935 onwards. Expanding the scope of research surrounding Operation Dixie and the 
CIO strategies employed within allows for a much clearer picture of the motivations for the 
undertaking, the drive to persevere, and the eventual end of the campaign to take shape. 
Chapter I. New Deal Labor and the South 
The activities of both the CIO and organized labor more generally did not occur in a 
vacuum. When the CIO first came into being in 1935, the United States was in the middle of the 
Great Depression. Unemployment during 1935 reached almost twenty percent while it was even 
higher in the preceding years.10 Organized labor, long demonized and brutalized by many 
American politicians and businessmen in its ongoing struggle for attempting to bring the power 
of unions to bear against industry, received a boon in 1933 in the form of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) which was a part of President Roosevelt’s “New Deal with the American 
people.” “Section 7(a) of the new law declared that workers had the right to bargain collectively 
with their employers through representatives of their own choosing. The law implied that it was 
illegitimate for employers to stifle unions, interfere with efforts to form unions, or refuse to enter 
into bargaining relationships. The passage of this act spurred major union membership gains 
among the UMW, ACWA, ILGWU, and others.11 Though the NIRA was seen as a breakthrough 
in federal policy towards labor, in reality it was deeply flawed. Section 7(a) lacked any sort of 
enforcement mechanism against corporations who violated it. Nonetheless, its passage 
encouraged workers to fight for their rights, and in 1934 there were more work stoppages since 
the early 1920s. This culminated in September with the general textile strike of 1934 in which 
 
10 “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1929-39: Estimating Methods,” (U.S. Bureau  
of Labor Statistics, 1948), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1948/article/pdf/labor-force-employment-and-
unemployment-1929-39-estimating-methods.pdf.  
11 Robert H. Zieger and Gilbert J. Gall, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century, 3rd ed. 
(London; Baltimore, Md; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 80-81. 
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some 400,000 textile workers walked off the job; it was the largest strike action in American 
history at that point.12 Senator Robert Wagner, a Democrat from New York and a long-time 
friend of the labor movement, disagreed with the way in which Section 7(a) was carried out in 
practice. When in May of 1935 the Supreme Court declared the NIRA illegal, Wagner wasted no 
time introducing his own bill, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), popularly known as the 
Wagner Act.13 As Graham Boone of the Monthly Labor Review noted, “The NLRA went beyond 
the NIRA by guaranteeing private-sector workers the right to unionize, allowing workers to 
engage in collective bargaining as a matter of national policy, providing for secret ballot 
elections as the means for choosing unions, and protecting workers from employer intimidation, 
coercion, and reprisal.”14 The Wagner Act also created a strong National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) to wield investigation and enforcement powers with regard to the provisions of the act. 
Despite the Wagner Act’s sweeping protections for organized labor, there were crucial omissions 
to the law. Key among these omissions was the fact that the NLRA did not protect agricultural 
workers and their right to organize and bargain. In 1935, when the Act was proposed, 
agricultural workers made up nearly twenty-five percent of the US workforce meaning that 
almost a quarter of the country’s workers were excluded from labor law protections.15 
Nevertheless, owing in part to the tremendous endorsement of support for the New Deal that 
came with the sweeping Democratic victories in the 1934 midterm election, the passage of the 
act was completed on July 5, 1935; most employers, however, resolved to openly flaunt the act 
 
12 Ibid, 73-77. 
13 Ibid, 77-81. 
14 Graham Boone, "Labor law highlights, 1915–2015," Monthly Labor Review, (U.S. Bureau of  
Labor Statistics, October 2015), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2015.38. 
15 United States National Labor Relations Board, Employee Rights Under the National Labor  
Relations Act, 2011, https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-
3788/employeerightsposter-8-5x11.pdf.; “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1929-39: Estimating 
Methods,” 51.  
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since they believed it would be struck down by the Supreme Court in due time much like the 
NIRA.16 The Supreme Court declared the Wagner Act constitutional in March of 1937 paving 
the way for the tremendous labor organizing victories around the country during 1937 and 
1938.17  
With respect to organized labor, the South can and should be considered as a mostly 
separate entity from the rest of the country. The region’s history of slavery, continued 
enforcement of segregation through Jim Crow laws, its reliance on agriculture, and a unique 
political hegemony created very difficult conditions under which to organize workers. The 
southern United States has a long history of meager union activity. This was usually limited to 
AFL organization of craft trades, but there were occasional exceptions to this rule such as the 
cases of the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU) and the Sharecroppers’ Union (SCU). 
While both the STFU and SCU were interracial organizations with black majorities often aided 
by communists and other radicals, the AFL, despite its nominal prohibition on discriminatory 
unions, comprised many unions which openly segregated black and white workers; some other 
AFL unions like the International Association of Machinists (IAM) barred black workers from 
joining entirely.18 The STFU and SCU, due to their focus on the work of organizing agricultural 
workers, were excluded from the provisions of the NLRA. The SCU’s newspaper chronicles the 
frustrations of these poor farmers through letters written to the paper. One, written from 
 
16 Patrick Renshaw, American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1985, (Jackson: University  
Press of Mississippi, 1991), 20.; Zieger, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century, 80-81.  
17 Zieger, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century, 80-81. 
18 F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 25-35.; Robin D. G. 
Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1990), 38-40. 
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“Starvation County, Mississippi,” criticized the governor’s stance on outside industry in 
Mississippi:  
Let us see what in short are the attractions for outside capital in Mississippi. 1. Cheap, unorganized labor. 2. 
80 per cent are politically disfranchised. 3. More than half the population is jim crowed. 4. Unemployment 
is great and greatly augmented by taking 3,000,000 acres out of production due to the tax sales. 5. Living 
standard very low. 6. Illiteracy, counting both Negro and white, almost 45 per cent…There can be only one 
answer to Gov. White and his associates who present a reactionary front against the common people of our 
state – a strong farmer-labor party founded on a strongly organized farmer-labor population with the active 
support of small merchants, teachers, and other exploited classes in our state. – A Homeless Taxpayer in 
Starvation County Miss.19 
The South’s political structure made the region ever more hostile to union organizing. 
Disfranchisement of the majority of the populations of many southern states, often due to 
theories of racial superiority, allowed one-party political hegemony to flourish. The fact that 
most southern politicians did not face serious challenges during elections allowed them to pursue 
a course which was increasingly accommodating to business and capital while opposing labor 
and unions.20 Given political cover, corporations were often much more hostile and antagonistic 
towards southern workers attempting to organize than their northern counterparts. Ed Crump’s 
political machine in Memphis coopted the support of early AFL unions to maintain control of the 
city and its politics. At the same time, Crump and his allies brutally repressed any union 
movement not aligned with the machine.21 In Gadsden, Alabama, furious local officials went to 
great lengths to prevent the organization of major industries such as steel and rubber; they passed 
numerous ordinances designed to prevent the gathering of workers in places all over the city. 
Pro-union workers were often terrorized by their anti-union counterparts, thugs supposedly on 
corporate payrolls, and even the police.22 The lack of allies in the region forced labor and its 
 
19 “A Letter From a Taxpayer In Starvation County, Mississippi,” Southern Farm Leader, August 1936. 6. 
20 Gerald Friedman, "The Political Economy of Early Southern Unionism: Race, Politics, and  
Labor in the South, 1880-1953," The Journal of Economic History 60, no. 2 (2000): 406-407. 
21 Roger Biles, "Ed Crump Versus the Unions: The Labor Movement in Memphis during the  
1930s," Labor History 25, no. 4 (1984): 536-540. 
22 Charles H. Martin, "Southern Labor Relations in Transition: Gadsden, Alabama, 1930-1943," The Journal of 
Southern History 47, no. 4 (1981): 549-554. 
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representatives to settle when looking for political support. A key example of this is the 1936 
Mississippi election for United States senator. Despite being acknowledged as a conservative, 
labor, including the AFL and national railway unions, threw their support behind Pat Harrison. 
The Chairman of the Mississippi State Legislative Board of the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen wrote of Harrison: “He has not been radical or taken part in any radical legislation but 
his thoughts and actions have been solid and constructive and we will be benefitted by his 
service.”23 Nonetheless, the unions backed Harrison, and this turn towards conservatism would 
continue to be apparent at various times in southern unionism over the next two decades. 
Chapter II. The Beginnings of the CIO 
The Committee for Industrial Organization, later renamed as the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), was formed by John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of 
America (UMW), following the 1935 annual American Federation of Labor (AFL) convention. 
During the convention, Lewis’ ideals of industrial unionism in which mass production workers 
are organized were rejected in favor of the AFL’s brand of craft unionism which focused its 
organizing efforts on skilled craftsmen.24 The AFL’s attempts to keep their craft unions of skilled 
laborers powerful had the effect of alienating the vast majority of workers in mass production 
industries. Additionally, many of these often-unskilled laborers were minority workers; by 
keeping the AFL focus away from industrial unionism, the organization was by default excluding 
a large portion of minority workers from their ranks; additionally, at least thirty-one AFL 
affiliates expressly barred black members from joining. John Lewis recognized the opportunities 
available in organizing this disparate group of workers and. attempted in vain to persuade the 
 
23 Wayne Flynt, "A Vignette in Southern Labor Politics--The 1936 Mississippi Senatorial  
Primary," The Mississippi Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1972): 96-98. 
24 Robert H Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 23-24. 
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AFL leadership to support his cause; when this proved unfruitful, Lewis allowed his passion for 
his ideals to show when he assaulted a fellow union leader who disagreed with the principles of 
industrial unionism.25 Frustrated, John Lewis decided to rally support from other supporters of 
mass production unions within the AFL. Lewis’s own UMW along with other unions such as the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) and the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union (ILGWU) formed the initial backbone of the Committee, but the group as a 
whole remained affiliated with the AFL.26  
Initially after forming their organization, Lewis and his fellow members remained 
committed to the AFL. They sought to advance the cause of industrial unionism among the many 
staunch craft unionists within the AFL. In short order, whatever dreams the men had of 
remaining allied with the AFL would be squashed. AFL leaders remained steadfastly opposed to 
any and all CIO activity and asserted that the AFL was the organization which should speak for 
organized labor.27 Conversely, Lewis, as leader of the CIO, grew more antagonistic towards AFL 
officials and policies. With tempers between the AFL and CIO flaring, the Committee’s first 
chance to make a large impact on labor came at the Goodyear plant in Akron, Ohio.28 At the 
plant, members of the United Rubber Workers struck against Goodyear. The workers showed a 
large degree of militancy in their actions on the picket line and against anti-union workers; this 
caused the AFL, who the URW was affiliated with at the time, to disapprove of the rubber 
workers tactics. Meanwhile, the CIO jumped at such an opportunity to support a group of 
industrial workers.29 The CIO actively supported the strike by sending organizers to show 
 
25 Ibid, 22-23.  
26 Ibid, 23-24.  
27 Ibid, 29-31.  
28 Ibid, 31-33.  
29 Zieger, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century, 84-86. 
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solidarity on the picket line, give speeches, and hand out pamphlets. For the URW, it was 
decisive CIO show of commitment to organizing mass production workers. The union itself 
decided to affiliate with the CIO in June of 1936.30 During this same month, the CIO formed the 
Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). The organizing of workers in the steel industry 
would provide a large challenge to the CIO due to several factors as described by historian 
Robert Zieger: 
Steel was the quintessential heavy industry, employing a half million workers in its various subdivisions. It 
was central to manufacturing and increasingly important in coal mining, and the steel industry was run by 
some of the most fervently antiunion businessmen in the country. The very fact that organized labor had 
suffered crushing defeats in 1892 and 1919–20 both complicated the task of winning the allegiance of 
steelworkers and made victory imperative.31 
Backed by 500,000 dollars of Lewis’ UMW money and aided by a partnership with the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AA), SWOC sidestepped the AFL and 
other unions by declaring its intent to organize all steel workers irrespective of jurisdiction. This 
act spurred the AFL to suspend all CIO member unions from their organization, and tensions 
continued to grow especially among Lewis and AFL president William Green who often hurled 
insults at each other publicly.32 Led by future CIO president Philip Murray, SWOC forged ahead 
with their plans to organize steel workers across the country. Despite having allocated two 
hundred experienced organizers to the campaign, results came slow during the first several 
months of SWOC organizing. Despite these initial uncertainties, Murray remained convinced 
that with the proper tools and enough time the steelworkers could be organized.33 
 
30 Ibid.  
31 Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955, 34-35. 
32 Ibid, 35-38.  
33 Zieger, The CIO: 1935-1955, 38-39. 
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Chapter III. Major Industries, Major Victories 
 During the early months of the SWOC organizing drive, the CIO received another 
opportunity to make leaps of progress for industrial unionism. United Auto Workers Local 34 
just outside of Atlanta struck at a General Motors (GM) plant in November of 1936. The workers 
employed a sit-down strike in which they would not leave the plant until an agreement was 
reached. This was to be the first in a chain of UAW strikes that would bring GM to its knees.34 In 
Flint, Michigan, the heart of GM’s auto production empire, spurred on by the CIO, the earlier 
success of the URW, and the earlier sit-down strikes at GM plants around the country, workers 
organized a sit-down strike which shut down two of GM’s large, important manufacturing 
facilities on December 30, 1936.35 While the CIO did little to manage the actual conduct of the 
strike at GM, John Lewis himself took up the cause of negotiating with state and federal officials 
to bring GM to the bargaining table with the UAW. Lewis remained opposed to demands that the 
workers vacate the plants before an agreement was signed. While the militant workers held onto 
the plants against police attempts to take them back, Lewis’ efforts were eventually able to help 
bring GM to the bargaining table. 36 On February eleventh of 1937, GM agreed “to recognize the 
UAW as the only legitimate labor organization in the plants affected by the strike for a period of 
six months.” The agreement won by the UAW in Flint provided an opportunity for the UAW to 
expand its membership both within and outside of GM. Additionally, “[t]he auto agreement was 
powerful vindication of the CIO course” of organizing mass production industrial facilities using 
militant tactics if necessary.37 
 
34 No More Moanin: Voices of Southern Struggle, Vol. 1, no. 3/4. (Atlanta, Georgia: Institute for Southern Studies, 
1974), 64-80. 
35 Zieger, The CIO: 1935-1955, 49-50.  
36 Ibid, 50-52. 
37 Zieger, The CIO: 1935-1955, 50-52.  
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 The CIO was the benefactor of another resounding victory shortly after the major UAW 
victory in Flint. The SWOC had grown steadily since its inception, and it could claim in its 
membership 125,000 steelworkers by the start of 1937. SWOC organizers and members agitated 
at steel mills throughout the country in attempts to force steel companies such as U.S. Steel, the 
largest steel producer in the United States, to the bargaining table. Finally, after months of 
secretive negotiations, on March 2, 1937, an agreement between the SWOC and U.S. Steel was 
announced by John Lewis and Myron Taylor, chairman of U.S. Steel. The SWOC had managed 
to win recognition, wage increases, and shortened working hours from one of the most 
notoriously antiunion companies in the country.38 Philip Murray, SWOC head, and other top 
leadership believed initially that the agreement with U.S. Steel would lead to agreements with 
other steel companies around the nation; these companies were known collectively as Little 
Steel. This was not to be, however, as Little Steel felt that U.S. Steel had betrayed their cause 
and remained opposed to union activity.39 Though some hardline companies would hold out 
against the CIO for years, many other plants would be organized through the continued hard 
work of the SWOC and its organizers. The fervor ignited by the U.S. Steel agreement enabled 
SWOC to constitute a membership of 300,000 workers by June of 1937.40 SWOC also made 
appreciable gains into the South where union membership was rare and often openly opposed by 
governments and corporations alike. As historian Ray Marshall noted, “When the SWOC started 
in the south, the only plant organized was the Kilby Car Manufacturing Company at Anniston, 
Alabama, but by the time of the 1937 wage and policy convention it had contracts with 18 steel 
mills, blast furnaces, foundries and fabricating plants, including Tennessee Coal and Iron, the 
 
38 Zieger, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth  
Century, 89-90. 
39 Ibid, 90-91. 
40 Ibid.  
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major company in the region.”41 SWOC continued to grow despite challenges and it would find 
itself as one of the largest CIO unions by the end of 1937. 
 SWOC was the benefactor of a history of southern organizing activity especially in 
Alabama. In 1931, the Share Croppers’ Union (SCU) was founded in Tallapoosa County as an 
all-black union with the support of white and black communists alike from Birmingham. Black 
women joined the union in large numbers and the movement encouraged the involvement of 
women in its affairs, and Al Murphy, secretary of the SCU, “…regarded the all-black movement 
as the very embodiment of black self-determination.”42 Though the SCU would not survive to 
unite with the CIO, the movement, which at one time claimed as many as 8000 members, helped 
to inspire many to join the communist party and agitate for labor gains in Alabama.43 When the 
CIO was formed in 1935, communist and black workers in Alabama quickly aligned themselves 
with the CIO due to its radical policies on race and gender. John Lewis, with his own interests in 
organizing the mines and steel mills of the state, readily accepted communist assistance; 
similarly, the Communist Party (CP) and its leadership, seeing an opportunity to gain legitimacy 
through the CIO, subordinated the party and its idealistic goals to the labor movement.44 These 
developments allowed the UMW to consistently make gains in Alabama’s mines throughout the 
1930s. The UMW also challenged the established racial order in the South by integrating union 
membership, meetings, and strikes. According to historians Edwin Brown and Colin Davis, 
“Blacks were elected as officers of locals and as members of mine committees, and they 
sometimes played a more prominent role than their titles suggested. For instance, … ‘the 
President was a white man but he mostly put [Carlee] Thomas [a black man and vice president] 
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up to speak’.”45 When SWOC arrived in Birmingham, it was able to use the experiences of 
communists and black workers who had long been fighting the corporations in the region. As 
black workers constituted almost fifty percent of Jefferson County steelworkers, SWOC required 
the participation of black workers in order to be successful. Fortunately, black workers were 
favorably disposed towards the CIO due to its promotion of civil rights unionism, and once the 
white workers began to join SWOC in large numbers, the success of the organizing drive was 
ensured.46 Without the work of the early communist activists in Birmingham and the SCU, the 
drive to organize workers in the mines and mills of Alabama would have undoubtedly proved a 
much more difficult task than the CIO actually found it in the 1930s. 
Chapter IV. A New Kind of Unionism 
With the massive success of the UAW and SWOC, the CIO began to grow at an 
astonishing rate. CIO national director John Brophy reported, “Hundreds of groups of all types 
are clamoring for charters…We have had to turn down hundreds of requests.”47 The primary 
targets of the CIO’s industrial unionism – the UMW, SWOC, and the UAW – saw large numbers 
join their ranks during 1937; there were approximately 600,000 mine workers, 400,000 
automobile workers, and 375,000 steelworkers in CIO unions by the end of the year.48 With 
additional workers outside of these industries eager to join the organization, the CIO began to set 
up an administrative structure which was ironically similar to that of the AFL. Regional and state 
directors were appointed, dramatic expansions in staff size took place, and new local unions were 
chartered across the country.49 Often, these new locals were left without an international union to 
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manage or advise them, and their management was handled by the National CIO office directly. 
To help accommodate many of these new locals, entire new international unions were chartered 
by the CIO.50 Unions such as the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of 
America (UCAPAWA) and the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU) among many others 
joined the CIO banner during this time of restructuring.51 As the CIO sought to expand both its 
regional influence and institutional size, it became clear that association with the AFL was no 
longer possible. Despite proclaimed desires by Lewis to not become a rival labor union to the 
AFL, the CIO was doing just that by expanding into areas and trades where the AFL had 
previously dominated.52  
It was during 1937 that the CIO leadership saw an opportunity to organize the mass 
production workers within the textile industry. A Textile Workers’ Organizing Committee 
(TWOC) was established which was based on the earlier SWOC; TWOC was headed by 
longtime CIO supporter and ACWA president Sidney Hillman. While Hillman and the drive’s 
other leadership greatly desired to organize southern textiles, they devoted the majority of their 
efforts to the northern textile mills where the prospects for organization were much more 
promising.53 Nevertheless, organizers were sent into the South and prominent liberals were 
recruited to help with the drive in the southern states. While the CIO could claim over 300,000 
textile workers in its membership by the end of 1937, there was no southern breakthrough 
despite the organizers’ best efforts. Critics of TWOC blamed the failure on the CIO’s lack of 
confronting racial issues as part of TWOC.54 In fact, Lewis and Hillman had chosen textiles to 
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infiltrate the south specifically because there were not many black people employed in the 
industry. Thus, the men believed that the campaign would come easier with the advantage of 
being able to sidestep the racial issue which dominated organizing in the South. Despite their 
beliefs, some local unionization movements featuring large numbers of African Americans were 
successful even where TWOC had failed.55 
UCAPAWA-CIO was founded in July of 1937 in Denver, Colorado. At the union’s 
founding convention, President Donald Henderson issued a strong rebuke of the AFL: “The 
policies followed in the past by the American Federation of Labor have not helped us. They have 
been too narrow and have been based too much upon straight business unions. They had to be 
able to make money out of the unions in the past in order to interest their organizers and 
officials.”56 UCAPAWA, Henderson said, had been built by the efforts of the workers, and it was 
represented by groups from twenty-four states at the convention. These groups represented a 
wide range of activities from packing house and cannery workers to sharecroppers and field 
laborers.57 Delegates at the convention were determined to make sure that discrimination had no 
place within their new union. As such, a “Resolution on Racial Discrimination” was passed 
during the convention which said, in part, “That we exert all our forces to fight for the rights of 
all minority peoples in extending any and all articles of legislation, Federal and State; and that 
this Convention commit itself to uphold the fundamental principle of NO DISCRIMINATION, 
toward the foreign-born and other minorities regardless of nationality, color, creed or political 
belief…” They also wanted to draw a clear line between CIO and AFL policy. This was 
accomplished by placing a rebuke of AFL policy in the very same resolution, “Resolved: That 
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we assert our condemnation of the policies of many A. F. of L. leaders against nationalities as a 
blot on organized labor…”58 The words were not hollow to the delegates at the convention; 
several telegrams were sent to officials from the convention as part of an effort to intervene on 
behalf of Mexican workers in Texas who were being deprived of their civil rights.59 UCAPAWA 
did not wait long to follow through on its offerings of support. In November of 1937, Henderson 
himself issued a charter to the Texas Pecan Shelling Workers Union, known as UCAPAWA 
Local 172; this local was dominated by Mexican workers and claimed upwards of 10,000 
members in 1937. Following announcement of a fifteen percent cut in wages, workers at the 
Southern Pecan Shelling Company along with several other plants in San Antonio went on strike 
on January 31, 1938.60 There were early attempts to stop the strike by the city of San Antonio. 
According to the CIO News, “The strike was met with every kind of police and company 
violence, including tear gas, beatings and wholesale arrests and evictions.”61 At least one 
company union member was sentenced to a year in jail for a brutal assault on the president of 
Local 172 after his attempts at organizing a crew of strikebreaking workers failed.62 According 
to a Department of Labor publication on agricultural unions, “Chief of Police Kilday consistently 
justified attempts to suppress the strike on the ground that it was organized and led by 
Communists. He said in later testimony: ‘I did not interfere with a strike! I interfered with a 
revolution’.” Despite widespread protests against the police treatment and a state commission 
concluding that “there was no evidence introduced before us that would justify police 
interference prohibiting picketing or the assembling of workers,” the UCAPAWA was refused an 
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injunction to keep the police from interfering.63 By December, despite the best efforts of the city 
of San Antonio, UCAPAWA had won 13 contracts which covered around 8000 workers in San 
Antonio.64 The strike had a strong effect of the Texas State CIO; due to the hostility experienced 
by the workers in San Antonio and the major victory won by the UCAPAWA there, the state 
CIO Council chose to hold its annual convention in the city in 1939.65 
In the great fury of organizing in 1937 and 1938, as noted by Robert Zieger, “It [The 
CIO] had welcomed, as the Federation [AFL] had never done, immigrants, blacks, and women 
without regard to race, gender or nationality. Especially with regard to the issue of race, national 
CIO leaders realized that strife between black and white workers “helped to confer unchallenged 
power on employers…”66 Due to the CIO position on civil rights, poll taxes, lynching, and many 
other contested issues, the organization itself was seen as much more radical than the AFL. As 
described by historian Michael Honey, “In places like Memphis, where blacks made up 80 
percent of the unskilled factory labor force, they became the first to join and the last to leave the 
CIO.”67 By contrast, the AFL often segregated their unions, and on some occasions, AFL unions 
denied black workers the option to organize at all. Especially in the south, few women were also 
afforded the opportunity to organize prior to the CIO’s mass organizing drives.68 Pressing on in 
the face of the obvious challenge of bringing their radical ideas to organize the South, the CIO 
did experience some successes in the region. A notable example is that of the International Union 
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of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine Mill), founding member of the CIO, and its activities 
around the Birmingham, Alabama mines and steel production facilities. Mine Mill was 
dominated by black workers and also served as a haven for Communist Party activists. Due to its 
make-up, the union was forced to constantly undergo scrutiny from racists and anti-communists 
in addition to the always present opposition of corporations and, in the South especially, 
politicians. Nevertheless, Mine Mill was able to win its first collective bargaining contract in 
Alabama in October of 1938.69 In support of their commitment to minorities espoused at the 
national CIO level, Mine Mill along with the UMW “launched mass voter registration drives in 
an effort to increase black and poor white political participation, and several Mine Mill locals 
organized voter registration workshops that were intended to inform union members of their 
legal and constitutional rights.”70 The experience of Mine Mill proved that organizing black 
workers and even communist workers was possible even in the Deep South with all its inherent 
challenges. As Robert Zieger wrote, “…CIO organizations, often establishing ties with black 
civic organizations, civil rights leaders, and churches, continued to stress the recruitment of black 
workers,” and Philip Murray, SWOC head, acknowledged that black workers were a crucial part 
of CIO success.71  
The UAW was among the first of the major CIO unions alongside SWOC to attempt a 
foray into organizing the American south. Despite the success of SWOC, the UAW found that 
many in the South were not friendly to unionization. Early attempts to organize a Ford 
production facility in Memphis ended with the primary UAW organizer nearly beaten to death by 
paid thugs on two separate occasions.72 At the time, Memphis was an extremely anti-union city 
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led by Ed Crump, former Mayor and ultimate arbiter of power within the city. Crump was a strict 
segregationist and despised unions, though AFL craft unions were usually welcome to organize 
as long as they avoided mass production workers and followed Crump’s wishes.73 The 
stranglehold on the city was finally loosened in early 1939 by a strike conducted by the Joint 
Council of River Workers, a 4000 man-strong alliance of black workers in the AFL’s 
International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) and the CIO’s Inland Boatmen’s Division of 
the National Maritime Union’s (NMU) white riverboat men. Efforts by AFL’s Memphis Labor 
Council leader Lev Loring and city officials to break the strike and reopen traffic on the 
Mississippi River were unsuccessful, and the workers were eventually recognized and given 
collective bargaining rights along with an official union contract.74 This constituted a major 
victory for the CIO. As historian Michael Honey noted, “The victory allowed the National 
Maritime Union to open the first CIO hall in Memphis, cracked the Crump machine’s stone wall 
of opposition to CIO interracial unions, and opened the way to more widespread union 
organization.”75 Nevertheless, victory did not always ensure safety. Thomas Watkins, leader of 
the ILA during the strike, was kidnapped along with his wife by uniformed Memphis police 
officers after the conclusion of the strike. Though the officers had plans to kill them both, 
Watkins was able to escape and his wife was thereafter left alive and arrested rather than killed. 
Seeing as the officers would not confess to kidnapping or attempting to murder Watkins, he 
received no justice under Jim Crow laws and was forced to leave Memphis. The heightened 
danger of interracial unionism in the South and in Memphis more generally can be summed up 
by Watkins’ words at the end of his official affidavit describing the event, “At this point [the end 
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of the strike] Loring advised me that he would dig my grave and see me in it. To which I gave no 
reply. He almost dug it with the aid of the Memphis police department.”76 
The CIO held its constitutional convention in November of 1938. At this meeting, the 
break with the AFL was formalized even though the two groups had been nominally separate 
since March of 1937.77 Another major event that occurred with the drafting of the organization’s 
constitution was a change in name to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) from the 
Committee for Industrial Organization. This occasion marked a monumental moment in the 
history of the organization, and there were high hopes for the CIO among its membership. 
According to Robert Zieger, CIO leaders were confident that “…[T]he CIO would redefine the 
role of the central labor federation. It would amass a great war chest, launch potent organizing 
drives, and claim, in Lewis's words, ‘increasing participation in the functions of government’."78 
Lewis and his fellow leaders were not coy about their undertakings, but there would be 
immediate challenges to overcome in order for them to see their dreams become reality. First, the 
AFL had stepped up its organizing efforts; now that the two organizations were essentially rivals 
for the same workers the CIO would have to compete directly with the AFL to organize workers 
on many more occasions than they had previously. Second, internal strife was threatening the 
effectiveness and the existence of some of the CIO’s largest unions including the UAW.79 Third, 
the CIO was in financial difficulties due to an ongoing recession and a failure to adequately 
collect dues from its members. John L. Lewis, whose UMW union subsidized a great deal of 
CIO activity, observed, “The financial nightmares around this . . . organization have been serious 
enough month after month and pay day after pay day, simply because somebody has been getting 
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a free ride.” Finally, the CIO received a great blow when David Dubinsky, president of the 
ILGWU, announced that his union would not be joining the new CIO after the constitutional 
convention.80 These challenges would be faced against the backdrop of impending world war 
after Germany opened the war in Europe on September 1st, 1939. The beginning of the war 
would provide both unique challenges and opportunities for the CIO over the next six years.  
Chapter V. Armaments, Organization, Tribulation 
The United States began an enormous defense rearmament campaign in response to the 
outbreak of war in Europe. The increased demand for defense industry workers played to labor’s 
strengths at the time; labor leaders saw opportunities to complete the organizing of the industrial 
core of the economy while also continuing to make gains in conditions and wages for current 
union members.81 These opportunities were jumped at by CIO leader John Lewis who declared 
repeatedly, “‘If it is our mission to save Western Civilization, then let us begin by saving it right 
here in our own country’ through improving living standards, abolishing racial discrimination, 
and democratizing the political process.”82 Before the CIO could turn its full attention to earning 
the gains set in front of it by the onset of war, the organization would have to deal with a major 
shakeup at the top of its chain of command. In 1940, President Roosevelt appointed a National 
Defense Commission with Sidney Hillman, ACWA president and CIO vice-president, as the 
chief representative of organized labor on the mobilization committee.83 This appointment 
inflamed the isolationist Lewis who had grown increasingly critical of Roosevelt. Hillman, on 
the other hand, believed that labor had a crucial part to play in the war effort and that 
associations with the federal government could be leveraged for labor gains in the future. Chief 
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among the disagreements between the men were two points: the awarding of federal contracts to 
corporations who violated labor laws and the reelection of Roosevelt as president. 84 While 
Hillman was able to provide assurance that new federal contracts would not go to those 
companies who violated labor laws, the gap between Lewis and Hillman on the issue of the 
presidential election was too far to bridge. Lewis would, in turn, shock almost every member of 
the House of Labor throughout the nation by supporting Republican Wendell Willkie for 
president and promised to step down if CIO workers repudiated him with their votes.85 As 
Roosevelt won a resounding victory, it was clear that labor would remain supportive of him and 
the Democratic Party. Shortly after the election, Lewis, true to his word, ended the monumental 
power struggle at the top of the CIO by stepping down as president. Philip Murray, SWOC head, 
replaced Lewis as president of the CIO on November 22, 1940.86 
With the introduction of Murray as CIO president, he began to make changes to ensure 
the long-term health of the organization. As historian Robert Zieger noted, “In 1941 under 
Murray's leadership the CIO became a coherent, fully functioning, and self-financing union 
entity as it never had been and likely could never have been under Lewis.”87 With the upturn in 
industrial employment that came with the war, Murray sought to level pressure on some of the 
largest corporations such as Ford and Goodyear which the CIO was unable to bring to the 
bargaining table during previous organizing drives. As part of this strategy, labor lawyers 
submitted numerous National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) complaints against these large 
companies in hopes of coopting the support of the federal government to force these companies 
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to negotiate.88 The CIO won its first major victory against Ford by virtue of an NLRB election on 
May 21, 1941. This hard-won victory came after over six months of organizing activity 
conducted against the fiercely anti-labor practices of Ford. Crucial to the success of the UAW in 
this drive were the approximately six thousand African American employees at the Ford Rouge 
plant in Detroit. UAW organizers appealed to National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) leaders in Detroit to help bridge the gap between the union and the 
black employees who viewed Ford favorably.89 Despite not convincing all of the workers, the 
partnership between UAW-CIO and the NAACP served to bring enough black workers over to 
the union side to ensure a sweeping victory in the election which cleared the way for elections 
and CIO victories in Ford plants around the country.90 Local 600 at Ford in Detroit would go on 
to provide nearly half of all black staffers hired by the UAW.91 Around the same time, Murray’s 
SWOC sought to finalize the gains it had earlier made by completing the organization of the 
Little Steel plants which had refused to follow U.S. Steel’s lead. SWOC took its first actions 
against Little Steel by striking at Bethlehem Steel on March 25, 1941.92 Though the company 
attempted to use threats and intimidation to stop the striking workers, enthusiasm for the union 
proved too strong. The company allowed NLRB elections to be held in which the CIO won 
handily. This only foreshadowed what was to come as the CIO consolidated its gains throughout 
the rest of the antagonistic Little Steel plants.93 Also in 1941, the CIO’s URW launched a drive 
to force Goodyear to the bargaining table.94 By October of the same year, Goodyear signed 
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contracts with URW locals at some of the biggest plants including those in Akron and Los 
Angeles.95  
Though not directly associated with the prewar defense buildup as some of the other CIO 
unions, UCAPAWA also looked to make gains during this crucial organizing period. The union 
was especially active in Memphis, where it became the fastest growing local in the city during 
1940. UCAPAWA in Memphis contained a number of members who were also members of the 
CP. The communists believed deeply in the principles of integration and civil rights for all.96 The 
union grew so quickly because of a commitment by these leftists to organize anyone including 
black workers and black and white workers together. In Memphis, where the Crump machine 
maintained a firm grip on the city and supported staunch segregation, the integration of workers 
in a union meant more than just new union members. According to Zieger, “At a time when civil 
rights organizations remained almost nonexistent in Memphis and the Mississippi Delta, the CIO 
provided an equal-rights philosophy combined with a specific means to change social 
conditions.” In addition to winning victories for workers in the cotton and food processing 
industries, the UCAPAWA also helped the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), a 
CIO member union, organize in woodworking factories and sawmills.97 In other arenas, 
UCAPAWA dealt with a significant number of setbacks which hampered the organization. In 
California, UCAPAWA was effective at organizing workers as most of them were either African 
American or Hispanic and welcomed the union support. Due to the seasonal nature of the field 
industry, the UCAPAWA wished to take time to stabilize its union by recruiting year-round 
cannery and packaging workers before consolidating gains against labor. The locals, however 
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mitigated by the International they might have been, continued to stage spontaneous strikes 
which often failed due to lack of planning.98 Presiding over the spontaneous failed strikes, a 
much smaller national budget, and renewed AFL emphasis on organizing field workers 
eventually forced the UCAPAWA to turn its attention almost completely away from the 
organization of field workers. As the UCAPAWA turned away from field workers, groups of 
locals in California and Florida among other states disbanded.99 When the UCAPAWA began to 
turn away from the organizing of field workers, the union looked to agricultural processing 
facilities often in metropolitan areas to make up gains. Despite this shift in priorities, data from 
the third national convention of UCAPAWA shows that in late 1940, the union had 158 contracts 
representing 20,000 workers with 223 different companies. The union also estimated total wage 
gains won over the previous year at just over one and a half million dollars. These numbers 
represent a marked increase over the gains made by UCAPAWA in the previous year.100 The 
following report was issued by the UCAPAWA during 1941: “At the present time UCAPAWA 
is concentrating on four principle organizing industrial campaigns. a) Fruit and Vegetable 
Processing plants; b) Cigar and Tobacco plants; c) Grain processing and Cereal plants; d) Cotton 
Seed and Cotton Compressing plants.”101 While focusing their efforts on industry, the 
UCAPAWA was able to make considerable gains for its workers in the run up to WWII. The 
union added forty-four contracts for a total of 202 representing over 36,000 workers as of 
October 1941. In addition to the new contracts and workers, the union reported wage gains 
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totaling twelve million between 1940 and 1941. On the eve of WWII, the UCAPAWA had 
organizers active in twenty-two cities around the nation.102 
Aside from the great successes of the CIO in the build up to American entry into the war, 
the organization was also forced to deal with its own further share of controversy. Between 
September and December of 1941, Lewis led miners in recurring strikes to gain a provision for a 
union shop in captive mines, mines that are owned by a company, for example U.S. Steel, for the 
purpose of producing its own coal. Despite feeling sympathetic to the cause, Murray and other 
CIO leaders recognized that the constant strikes were stirring anti-union feelings among the 
public, press, and Congress.103 Failing to reach a consensus with Murray, Lewis grew more 
antagonistic towards the CIO; indeed, he often used UMW resources in attempts to hamper the 
CIO. Finally, in May of 1942, Lewis and his UMW left the CIO in what amounted to the natural 
conclusion of the saga that proceeded it. The CIO and its member unions, for so long dependent 
on Lewis and his UMW, now had the numerical and financial strength to survive and thrive 
through the departure.104 
Chapter VI. War Requires Cooperation 
With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, the United States entered 
World War II. Seeking to take advantage of industrial cooperation for the war effort, FDR 
convened a meeting of labor and business leaders shortly after US entry into the war. As 
described by historian Patrick Renshaw, “After some weeks discussion, representatives agreed to 
a three-point program for industrial peace: no strikes or lockouts for the duration of hostilities; 
peaceful settlement of all industrial disputes; and the creation of a tripartite board with labor, 
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management and the public each represented by four members to be called the National War 
Labor Board” (NWLB).105 The no-strike pledge, supported by the CIO, served to lower lost man 
days from over twenty-three million in 1941 to just over four million in 1942.106 It was 
wholeheartedly supported by Murray and much of the CIO leadership as essential to secure the 
CIO’s place in the wartime industrial-military-government apparatus which rapidly developed. 
Murray declared, “"Labor is determined to place itself in the forefront in the battle of achieving 
maximum production."107 
The beginning of the war brought immediate advantages to the CIO especially in terms of 
membership gains. As production of war materiel increased dramatically, tens of thousands of 
new workers began work in industries where the CIO already held significant footholds. As these 
workers were brought into the union, there were challenges which had to be confronted.108 Many 
of these new workers during the war years were either women or black workers, both of whom 
had long denied opportunities for industrial employment, due to a lack of white manpower given 
the demands of the war. During the war, women made up a full thirty-six percent of the civilian 
workforce while one million new black workers also entered the workforce during this period.109 
The fact that these changes took place in such rapid manner only added to the already simmering 
racist and discriminatory feelings in many parts of the country. To attempt to combat these 
issues, President Roosevelt signed an executive order in June 1941 to allow for “full and 
equitable participation of all workers in the defense industries without discrimination.” This 
mandate was enforced by the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which was also 
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created by the executive order. The job of the FEPC was to investigate discrimination complaints 
and recommend action on them.110 Despite continually ruling in favor of black workers, the 
FEPC lacked a way to enforce its rulings; thus, many of them were ignored, especially in the 
South where racism ran most rampant. Though the inability to enforce its rulings handicapped 
the FEPC, it served as a beacon for black workers. The fact that the federal government was 
publicly endorsing a policy of non-discrimination and created an organization to oversee it meant 
a lot for those who before had few options to address the injustice they experienced.111 The CIO, 
with its longstanding belief that discrimination had no place in its organization, supported the 
work of the FEPC; speaking at the CIO’s Fifth National Convention, Philip Murray proclaimed, 
“CIO’s traditional battle to eliminate discrimination against racial or national minority groups in 
American industry has been materially assisted by the work of the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee.”112 Reactions to increased black participation in the workforce angered groups of 
white workers around the country who felt that their own positions were threatened by this influx 
of new laborers. These intensified feelings produced hate strikes among white CIO workers to 
keep African Americans out of the workplace or to prevent the promotion of black workers. 
Some of the most notorious strikes in Detroit, a hotbed of racial tension, were brought to heel by 
the UAW and its staunch anti-discrimination stance. UAW President R.J. Thomas personally 
intervened to compel the local at the Packard aircraft engine facility to call off the strike and 
discharge workers who went against the UAW’s official policy of nondiscrimination. By 
contrast, the AFL’s closest rival to the UAW, the International Association of Machinists (IAM), 
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continued to bar African Americans as a whole from the organization through the war years.113 
As these hate strikes were erupting in places like Mobile and Detroit, the CIO gained Willard 
Townsend as its first black executive board member along with the union he led, the United 
Transport Service Employees (UTSE), which was predominately comprised of black 
members.114 As part of further efforts to combat racism and discrimination among its workers, 
the CIO announced at its Fifth National Convention the “Formation of a CIO Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.” Describing its purpose, the CIO News declared, “This 
committee has a detailed plan…designed to carry on the fight against racial discrimination, and 
discrimination against Negroes in particular, on both an immediate and a long-time basis.”115 
CARD, as this committee became known, set about to encourage racial understanding through 
conferences, letters, and pamphlets while also supporting nondiscriminatory practices of the 
federal government like the FEPC and promoting the inclusion of clauses prohibiting 
discriminatory hiring practices in union contracts. The organization also encouraged and aided 
the formation of anti-discrimination committees throughout affiliated CIO unions and 
organizations. By the end of the war, over one hundred of these councils had been established 
within the CIO network to advance the causes of racial equity.116 
The introduction of the no-strike pledge did not mean that the CIO was resolved to wait 
out the conflict until attempting to secure a better deal for its members. Key among CIO activity 
during the war was the organization of the new workers entering key industries and the 
unionization of unconquered plants as well as the continued winning of improved conditions for 
its workers. Since the CIO had committed itself to the no-strike pledge, the main avenue for 
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organizing and making contractual gains for workers was the NWLB. The NWLB, however, 
served a dual purpose of ensuring that inflation remained controlled during the war.117 Given this 
dual purpose, it is natural that some NWLB decisions inflamed labor leaders who were mostly 
concerned with winning better wages and conditions for their workers. A key decision early in 
the war established the Little Steel formula which was used as a scale to determine wage 
increases relative to cost-of-living increases.118 The NWLB voted to give steelworkers, 
represented by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) as SWOC was now known, at 
Little Steel plants a five and one-half cents increase per hour instead of the full dollar that labor 
was requesting. This formula substantially hampered the CIO’s bargaining abilities with regard 
to wages, but in the same decision the NWLB sanctioned several points crucial to union security 
which the CIO leaders were enthralled about. The board ordered a maintenance of membership 
clause as well as the check-off of union dues among the Little Steel workers.119 The maintenance 
of membership provision required new workers to join the union within a fifteen-day period of 
entering employment with a company under union contract. The check-off of dues ensured 
automatic payments through the aid of employers themselves and greatly improved the overall 
payment of dues in CIO unions.120 These guarantees of union security swelled the ranks of the 
CIO and its unions during the war, and the consistent payment of dues allowed the organization 
to achieve solvency and surplus.121 Though the tools of union security were thoroughly enjoyed 
by the CIO, the loss of the strike as a bargaining tool with corporations had serious consequences 
for the organization. Many of the largest CIO actions of the 1930s and early 1940s were built 
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around grassroots militancy and demonstrated techniques such as the sit-down strike to force 
employers to the bargaining table. The rank-and-file membership of the CIO grew restless and 
dejected by the lack of options they had to force collective bargaining on the part of the 
employer.122 As NWLB directives grew more onerous to workers, strikes began to break out in 
greater numbers. Following the great reduction in strikes and idle days in 1942, strikes began to 
increase in frequency and scale during 1943 and 1944. Despite being more numerous and 
involving more workers, the average length of strikes was substantially shortened to less than six 
days from a previous low of nearly twelve days.123 Faced with government pressure and threats 
to revoke maintenance of membership clauses, the CIO itself played a large role in ending many 
of these strikes. Murray commented in 1944, “a very substantial portion . . . of the monies 
collected by each of the international organizations [in dues payments] is now being used to 
enforce the directives of the National War Labor Board . . . which we do not believe in.”124 
Ironically, the historically most militant group represented within the CIO, communists, were the 
staunchest supporters of the no-strike pledge. Despite disagreeing with many NWLB policies, 
many communist union leaders in such unions as UCAPAWA and Mine Mill remained 
committed to this policy throughout the war. Overall, the war had a decidedly strong effect in 
removing the union leadership from being closely involved with the membership of the unions; 
massive growth in membership and the increased collection of dues allowed the leadership to 
make this turn away from the rank-and-file membership while a desire to adhere to federal 
policies and a general desire to be seen as patriotic and supportive of the war effort more often 
drove their actions than the workers who they actually represented.  
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Chapter VII. The CIO Marches South 
While the CIO faced numerous tribulations in dealing with the war and the NWLB, the 
labor federation continued to make strides in the organizing of workers outside of maintenance 
of membership clauses. The CIO, remembering the 1941 convention pledge to organize the 
South, set about to make good on its vision. The industrial workforce in the South expanded 
dramatically due to the demands of the war; armed with the support of the federal government 
and the NWLB, the CIO made numerous incursions into hostile southern territory in the hopes of 
organizing workers. Buoyed by flush pockets and an extremely tight labor market, the CIO was 
able to make some significant strides across the South.125 In Gadsden, Alabama, ferocious anti-
union sentiment prior to WWII often led to violence and employers instilled fear in employees 
who wished to unionize. Softened by a desire to win war contracts, the town slowly softened its 
stance against organization during the war. The CIO did not waste the opportunity. First, the 
USWA won an NLRB election by nearly five-to-one odds with over 2000 votes in favor at a 
Little Steel plant in Gadsden.126 The URW won a similarly emphatic victory less than a month 
later at the Goodyear plant which for so long had stood as a staunch opponent to unionism.127 
Similarly, the war and federal support for industrial-union relations forced the city of Memphis 
to soften its stance on unionism. Previously, the political machine of Ed Crump had served to 
keep unionism in the city at a minimum. Despite this, UCAPAWA and the National Maritime 
Union (NMU), both unions known for their support of integration, had been able to gain 
membership in the city and provide the CIO with a base of operations there.128 The URW, which 
had been unsuccessful in organizing the large Firestone plant in 1940 despite the almost 
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unanimous support of black workers, returned to Memphis in 1943; white workers, now 
disillusioned with the AFL, voted for the URW. By war’s end, this plant would comprise 7000 
CIO workers, a third of these women and a third of them black. CIO efforts in Memphis would 
allow over half of the city’s industrial workforce, 20,000 people, to be organized by 1943.129 
Major southern gains were also experienced by the Oil Workers International Union (OWIU). 
The union more than doubled its membership and number of contracts during the war; most of 
these gains were realized in the South, specifically along the Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast. A 
fledgling union at the start of the war, the OWIU emerged from the conflict with a strong 
southern base of workers and the financial means to press organizing into other areas of the 
country.130 The Textile Workers’ Union of America, formerly known as TWOC, also saw 
dramatic growth during the war period. The union increased its overall membership by 133,000 
workers during the war; this number included nearly 38,000 southern workers represented by 71 
contracts.131 The union’s southern gains remained concentrated in the Piedmont region of 
Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia, and arguably the most impressive organizing victory of the 
entire war came at a southern mill. In July of 1942, the Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills in 
Danville, Virginia, largest in the world, were organized by the TWUA in the largest election in 
the union’s history. The victory also carried a symbolic element as the mills were the site of a 
failed 4000 worker strong, four-month strike in 1930.132 UCAPAWA was another of the CIO 
unions which benefitted from the war and its effect on labor. As of the Fifth National Convention 
in late 1944, UCAPAWA held 493 contracts representing 77,000 workers at seasonal peak. This 
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was a drastic improvement over prewar numbers representing an almost 200 percent jump in 
contracts and workers.133 The union continued to be active across the country and made further 
inroads into the food and agricultural processing and packaging industries of the South by 
organizing in places such as Memphis and Little Rock, Arkansas.134 Nowhere did UCAPAWA 
experience such success as at the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company in Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina. The UCAPAWA attempt to organize the plants differed from two earlier AFL attempts 
in that UCAPAWA focused more on black workers, who made up over two-thirds of the 10,000 
strong workforce. Organizers began their work at the plant in 1941, but it would not be until 
1943 that their plans would pay off.135 Theodosia Simpson, a worker at Reynolds Plant #65 and a 
UCAPAWA organizer, described the beginnings on June 17, 1943 of what would become a 
massive strike at R.J. Reynolds, “So at lunchtime we got together and decided, let’s do it after 
lunch. So when they pulled the whistle for us to go to work, all that I had talked to just sat down 
on the little stool that was out from the machine, and turned their backs to the machine. Well, 
when some of the others saw what was happening, they didn’t turn on their machines. They 
weren’t members of the union, but they didn’t.” The initial group of strikers were nearly all 
women reflecting the fact that women made up a significant portion of the workers at 
Reynolds.136 As the strike dragged on, more and more workers joined the movement. As Robert 
Black, who worked at Reynolds from the time he was six years old, put it, “The people realized 
something they had never thought of before: we hold the strength in our hands to stop this 
company. They had allowed that company to ride over them roughshod all those years, with their 
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heads bowed.”137 UCAPAWA, wishing to honor the no-strike pledge of the CIO, worked to 
forge an agreement with Reynolds vice president John Whitaker which ended the strike, but the 
company continued to fight potential NLRB elections in the courts. Finally, in December the 
election was held, and the UCAPAWA-CIO emerged victorious by a margin of better than two 
to one.138 At the Fifth UCAPAWA convention in late 1944, the union changed its name to the 
Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of America (FTA). This change was 
done primarily to include “tobacco” in the name of the union; it experienced a 155 percent 
increase in tobacco workers under contract between 1942 and 1944, making it the second largest 
industry represented by the union after food processing and packaging.139  
Though the CIO’s major southern victories are some of the best documented, organizing 
activity was not limited to large concerns. In early 1942, the United Packinghouse Workers of 
America (UPWA) signed contracts with three prominent Louisiana sugar companies covering 
four thousand workers. The union quickly followed this up with victories in two Chattanooga, 
Tennessee packinghouses.140 Around this same time, UCAPAWA continued its efforts across the 
South. Local 19 in Memphis was instrumental in winning contracts at four cotton compresses in 
the city early in the year; the union was quickly able to use its influence to force a pay raise for 
the workers covered under its contracts.141 UCAPAWA secured its first contract in Arkansas in 
March of 1942 at the Arkansas Fertilizer Co. followed very shortly by another at Pierce Williams 
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in Jonesboro.142 The southern momentum was kept up as the UCAPAWA continued to make 
gains; in a three month span the union secured eight contracts in Memphis and Little Rock. 
Additionally, UCAPAWA was even able to charter a local in the company town of Truman, 
Arkansas despite staunch company resistance.143 In late 1942, UCAPAWA organized tobacco 
plants in Richmond, Virginia and Charleston, South Carolina foreshadowing the Reynolds 
victory which was to come.144 With the opening of 1943, UCAPAWA began a concerted 
organizing drive among the citrus workers in Florida with the ultimate goal of organizing 30,000 
workers.145  
As war production continued steadily into 1943, the early months of the year saw 
windfalls for the CIO across the South. The UAW secured the last division of the North 
American Aviation Plant, one of the largest manufacturing facilities in Texas, to complete CIO 
control of the plant.146 The International Woodworkers of America (IWA) won key victories in 
Vicksburg and Memphis despite organizers being subjected to beatings.147 In Fort Worth, the 
UPWA won a major victory at the large Armour plant which had been the site of organizing 
activity since 1938.148 This fall of this large plant to the union would spur other Armour facilities 
in Memphis and Mt. Pleasant, Tennessee to organize by years end.149 Through WLB decisions, 
UCAPAWA was able to win wage gains for the Florida citrus workers only four months into 
their organizing drive.150 The union’s success spurred the creation of a state CIO council in 
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Florida to better coordinate the current CIO union drives within the state.151 Meanwhile, 
UCAPAWA continued to expand into tobacco production by organizing two more large tobacco 
plants in Winston Salem to go along with the massive Reynolds victory.152  
CIO activity in the South did not slow down during 1944. If anything, the organizing of 
workers in rural areas sped up during the year. The organizing of workers in rural settings was 
driven by UCAPAWA and the IWA, but the CIO and its member unions continued to focus on 
crucial war industries in more metropolitan areas as well. The IWA began the year by securing 
NLRB election victories at plants in Bolton, Mississippi and Suffolk, Virginia as well as at plants 
in several rural Arkansas towns.153 The union continued its momentum in Arkansas by 
organizing four plants in Helena by June. Several additional new plants in Arkansas and 
Memphis were added to IWA rolls before the end of the year. In December, the union gained 
ground in Mississippi when it organized the Port Gibson Veneer and Box Co. winning a large 
majority of the NLRB votes.154 In Alabama, the USWA alongside Mine Mill continued to 
organize workers in Birmingham and in small surrounding towns such as Keystone. Alongside 
these unions, the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (IUMSWA) 
also worked to organize shipyards in Mobile which were critical to the war effort.155 In early 
1944, UCAPAWA claimed victory in the Virginia peanut belt comprising several facilities in 
Suffolk and Franklin.156 The union also captured several packing sheds in Mercedes, Texas and 
Harvey, Louisiana through elections as well as claimed victory in four different Memphis 
 
151 “Florida CIO Council Hits Hard at Disruptors,” UCAPAWA News, May 15, 1943, 5. 
152 “Cannery Workers Go to Town,” CIO News, September 6, 1943, 8. 
153 “Organizing,” CIO News, January 10, 1944, 7.; January 17, 1944, 7.; March 20, 1944, 7.  
154 Ibid. June 26, 1944, 7.; July 10, 1944, 7.; December 4, 1944, 18. 
155 Ibid. May 29, 1944, 7.; December 25, 1944, 9. 
156 “How We Won Victory in The Virginia Peanut Belt,” UCAPAWA News, January 27, 1944, 8.  
43 
 
plants.157 UCAPAWA continued to actively pursue the organizing drive in Florida as evidenced 
by International President Henderson’s early 1944 visit to Waverly to encourage workers in their 
efforts to secure an NLRB election.158 Throughout the year, UCAPAWA continued to force the 
issue against companies by bringing cases before the War Labor Board. The persistence of the 
union won hard fought wage gains for their workers.159 In late 1944, UCAPAWA continued to 
organize along the Mississippi River, winning elections in both Memphis and Port Gibson, 
Mississippi.160 At the time of the union’s Fifth National Convention in November of 1944, the 
Mississippi Delta region harbored the largest number of workers represented by UCAPAWA in 
the South after the tobacco producing areas of Virginia and the Carolinas.161 UCAPAWA, now 
known as FTA, continued to push for organization in 1945. Throughout 1945, FTA exploited 
areas where it already had strength in order to further organize across the South. This resulted in 
victories in places such as Little Rock, Memphis, Charlotte, and Mercedes, Texas where the 
union maintained a very active presence.162 The FTA continued to use WLB rulings to win wage 
gains and better conditions for their employees under contract. Coming off a renewed interest in 
southern organizing at the FTA convention in 1944 and in attempt to line up with stated CIO 
policy to organize the South, a regional committee was established to coordinate union activities 
in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama.163 The IWA continued to be active in the South in the waning 
months of the war. Over ten plants in Little Rock, Memphis, and Vicksburg were organized by 
the union, but organizers did not stop at these centers of IWA activity. Plants in places such as 
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Emporia, Virginia, Clennora and Alexandria, Louisiana, and Greenville, Alabama were also 
organized by the IWA.164 The fact that organizing activity of the CIO and its member unions was 
assuredly not restricted to only large, metropolitan concerns shows that the CIO had a base of 
operations in the South. To be certain, the network of unions was nowhere near as strong as 
those in the northern states, but it is important to acknowledge that the CIO did not begin the 
postwar era without supporters and those who believed in the union across the South.  
The war offered the CIO a wide range of challenges and opportunities, but the CIO 
seemed to emerge from the war with significant strength, both in numbers and in the financial 
realm. The CIO added 2.1 million members during the course of the war, and this figure includes 
the loss of John Lewis’ UMW workers. The UAW emerged from the war with over one million 
members while the USWA claimed over 700,000 workers by the end of the conflict. The United 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) expanded from under 50,000 workers 
to over 430,000.165 TWUA, Mine Mill, and the Packinghouse Workers more than doubled their 
memberships during the war, and IUMSWA more than quadrupled its membership from 35,000 
to over 200,000. The maintenance of membership and dues check-offs afforded by the NWLB 
substantially aided the CIO with its upswing in membership. Van Bittner, future director of 
Operation Dixie, asserted, "If it was not for the union security given to our unions by the 
National War Labor Board we wouldn't have 5,000,000 dues-paying members [sic] in the 
C.I.O."166 Despite the NWLB’s penchant for riling labor leaders, it proved encouraging that the 
federal government backed up favorable decisions for labor; in several instances, the army was 
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called upon to seize plants in order to force compliance with orders.167 As the war came to a 
close, representatives of organized labor, both AFL and CIO officials, focused on keeping a firm 
grasp on the gains that were made throughout the war years. Additionally, plans were made for 
organizing in the postwar era bolstered by millions of new members and their financial 
contributions. The CIO, ever conscious of its political identity, determined to head into this new 
era with the promise of a better deal for all under the banner of industrial unionism. At the 1944 
CIO convention Philip Murray said, “God help the Negro in America, and God help the minority 
groups of America, were it not for the splendid work that is being done by this great institution 
of yours and mine. We don’t confine ourselves to the mere adoption of resolutions in meetings of 
this kind; we make those resolution effective and workable.”168 
Chapter VIII. Winds of Change 
World War II, as its name suggests, affected nearly the entire world. The United States, 
being heavily involved in the conflict, underwent a great deal of change during the war years. 
The ways in which the US was changing during the conflict held important implications for 
organized labor as it looked toward the postwar era. The demand for labor spurred massive social 
upheaval around the country as black workers and female workers took jobs previously held in 
large part by white males. This reorganization of the labor force resulted in a large number of 
African Americans, as many as three to five million, leaving the South in search of jobs in the 
defense industry.169 Aside from those black and white who left the South in search of work, 
many others also moved around the South in attempts to find work in the ballooning defense 
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industry. This mass migration was spurred by an incredibly sharp increase in the industrialization 
of the South necessitated by the war effort along with the effects of a continued decline in the 
agricultural economy that had been felt by many rural southerners for years.170 Seemingly 
overnight, boomtowns popped up around defense industry sites. Many rural southerners flocked 
to cities and towns in search of the industrial employment which the war demanded.171 This 
boom in southern industrial employment, an increase of 1.2 million jobs at its peak, provided the 
opportunity for the CIO to greatly increase its membership during the war.172  
To reap the benefits of this new membership, however, organized labor had to cooperate 
closely with the federal government. It was recognized at an early stage in the war that conflicts 
between labor and management ran the risk of bringing strikes and subsequently bottlenecks and 
irregular prices to the whole country. With the war economy necessitating maximum production, 
labor-management conflicts seemed poised to derail the war effort. Recognizing that labor 
leaders would never agree to work with management unless they were on equal standing, FDR 
created the National War Labor Board with equal representatives of labor, management, and the 
public at large.173 As a result, the majority of unions including the CIO entered into a pledge not 
to strike for the duration of the war. Philip Murray wrote about the policy:  
Because we realize the importance of maintaining continuity of operation and achieving all-out industrial 
production in this emergency we have agreed to a no-strike policy for the duration of the war. In order that 
labor’s rights may not be infringed upon, however, we have opposed repressive anti-strike legislation and 
have insisted that the most effective way to prevent stoppages is through voluntary agreement on 
procedures for the peaceful adjustment of all disputes.174 
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As previously mentioned, the surrender of what was considered labor’s most powerful weapon 
against management spawned discontent among workers who felt they were being taken 
advantage of by their employers. Despite the pledge drastically shrinking the number of strikes 
and the man-days lost to strikes, the CIO and its members actions were placed under extreme 
scrutiny as a result of the importance of the war and the previously agreed upon no-strike 
pledge.175 The national unions attempted to ensure that their workers were not being taken 
advantage of by communicating openly with the War Labor Board, but WLB decisions 
continued to antagonize workers faced with increasing hours and production goals due to 
wartime needs.176 Lacking their primary mechanism for forcing the hands of employers, the CIO 
continued to develop its reputation for activism. The federation threw itself wholeheartedly into 
supporting the war effort in attempts to swing public opinion behind labor, but that did not stop 
the CIO from acting on behalf of its workers.177 A key example of this is longstanding support 
for abolition of the poll tax in the Southern states. The CIO branded itself as a champion of 
democracy in the South where voting rates were extremely low and the poor and minorities were 
almost always excluded from voting.178 The attacks on the poll tax served a dual purpose as the 
CIO was also able to personally criticize southern politicians many of whom were some of the 
labor movement’s staunchest opponents. The support of the CIO resonated with many 
southerners like Jesse Burton, sharecropper and secretary of UCAPAWA Local 285 at Camp 
Hill, Alabama, who said, “A new light is shining and we are all waking up and will sleep no 
more. That new light is the CIO.” Similarly, a tire builder at the Firestone plant in Memphis said, 
“Experience has shown us that only through the CIO can we get the kind of pay and conditions 
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we Southern workers need… Thank God we are not falling so much for propaganda to divide us 
and keep us barely at a subsistence level. Thank God for the CIO that has helped us to 
understand these things.”179 Certainly, this support was nowhere close to unanimous and many 
people around the country detested the CIO and its activities. Disdain for the CIO was nothing 
new, but during the war years even small job actions brought heightened criticism especially if 
they were related to war production.  
Unfortunately for the CIO, its large industrial membership meant that many of its 
workers were involved in war industries; thus, when work actions occurred in these industries, 
they were heavily publicized and strongly condemned.180 A constituent of Senator James 
Eastland of Mississippi from Hattiesburg wrote to him declaring, “Our neutrality law should be 
repealed outright and these CIO strikes ended by force if necessary. If we are to defend our 
government we must stop all strikes in defense program work.”181 The CIO, however, was not 
responsible for these strikes; the organization refrained from authorizing strikes and often 
attempted to put an end to them whenever they popped up. CIO International Unions such as 
UCAPAWA, seeking to show support for the no-strike pledge, fined workers responsible for 
walkouts while also making sure to levy blame at the WLB.182 Nevertheless, conservative 
Congressmen used the strike issue to condemn the CIO and the labor movement generally. In 
March of 1942, US Representative John Rankin made several speeches imploring his Senate 
colleagues to take up anti-labor legislation passed by the House. Rankin painted the struggle 
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against labor as one of survival declaring, “We must not follow the course of France. She first 
capitulated to a few labor, financial and industrial racketeers, then sank into Communism and 
paid the supreme penalty of defeat, humiliation and disgrace. Her brave men fighting at the front 
were not supplied the weapons necessary for defense.”183 While marked by sensationalism, 
conservative appeals such as Rankin’s found their mark by the time of the 1942 midterm 
elections. Republicans gained forty-four House seats along with nine Senate seats; these seats 
lost were held by true liberals and friends of labor as opposed to the overwhelmingly 
conservative southern Democrats. Speaking on the election, one CIO union leader lamented, 
“"When you come to examine the result of the recent election, you will find the entire element 
we cleaned out . . . in 1932 and 1936 are back stronger than ever."184 In 1943, strikes increased 
from 1942 levels as continued worker unrest boiled over across the country; despite this, the CIO 
and its member unions remained committed to the no-strike pledge.  
Ultimately, it would be John Lewis and his UMW who would bring about serious 
complications for the organization. Beginning on April 1, 1943 and continuing at intervals 
throughout the year, Lewis ordered some 400,000 miners out on strike to protest the lack of a 
wage adjustment by the WLB. The CIO issued a statement in support of the miners and their 
wage adjustment, but the Executive Board also made sure to criticize the strikes of the miners 
and the general actions of Lewis as being detrimental to the war effort.185 The reaction of both 
the American public and Congress was swift and decidedly anti-labor. Those such as Senator 
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Eastland gave speeches which asserted that “[l]abor needs protection from the grasping, greedy 
racketeer. The cause of labor needs protection from the saboteur who parades in labor’s noble 
robes.” The senator also stated of the striking miners, “They sabotage the war effort and 
endanger the lives of our soldiers, increase casualties and sacrifices of our men. Because of 
strikes in this time of war, men can be killed, our nation destroyed, and our people enslaved.”186 
Those writing to their Congressmen about the ongoing situation often reflected these antagonistic 
views; one Mississippi man asserted that “[i]n any other country than these USA, J.L.L [John 
Lewis] might get the firing squad or neuse [sic].”187 A similarly outraged individual wrote of the 
situation, “…this is a responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of Congress and none other than 
Congress and it seems to me that any congressman or senator unwilling to join in the undertaking 
of the curbing of these outlaws should have a plane chartered to carry him across to Hitler’s 
quarters.”188 With these attitudes toward labor bubbling up as a result of the strike, it is no 
wonder that substantial progress was made regarding anti-labor legislation in less than two 
months after the beginning of the strike. By mid-May, Murray and the other CIO Executive 
Board members were pleading with Congress not to pass the War Labor Disputes Act, or the 
Smith-Connally Act as it is more popularly known.189 CIO leaders argued that the Act would 
unnecessarily punish millions of workers due to the antagonistic actions of only one man, Lewis. 
Both national CIO leaders and local labor supporters wrote to Congress in protest of the bill as 
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undemocratic and unfair.190 Their efforts went unheeded as the Act was passed by a greater than 
two-to-one majority in order to override President Roosevelt’s veto.191 Described by historian 
Robert Zieger, the Act, which itself was a combination of proposals introduced by Senator Tom 
Connally of Texas and Rep. Howard Smith of Virginia, “…mandated a thirty-day waiting period 
between the holding of a strike vote and a walkout, provided for government takeover of military 
production plants threatened by labor disputes, barred strikes and strike advocacy in federally run 
facilities, and limited political activities of labor unions.”192 Despite suffering a political setback 
as a result of the bill, the CIO’s Executive Board, led by Murray, remained committed to the no-
strike pledge for the purpose of winning the war.193 Deprived of the option to strike without 
alienating public opinion or receiving the ire of the federal government and sensing the winds of 
political change moving across the country, the CIO resolved to further its efforts in the political 
arena after Smith-Connally.  
 After the passage of the Smith-Connally Act, the CIO put into motion a plan which was 
designed to “inject its ideological and programmatic agenda directly into the Democratic Party’s 
bloodstream.”194 In the summer of 1943, the organization created the CIO Political Action 
Committee (PAC) to achieve this goal; it was the brainchild of and chaired by Sidney Hillman. 
At its inaugural conference in Chicago, according to the CIO News, over 300 delegates “voted 
unanimously to support the election of candidates in national, state and city-wide contests in 
1943 and 1944 who have demonstrated their consistent support of President Roosevelt on all 
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major issues, domestic and foreign.”195 Following the lead of the CIO, many member unions 
including UCAPAWA encouraged political action among their workers. The CIO PAC held a 
conference in Birmingham only a few weeks after its convention in Chicago; the event was 
highly regarded by the CIO at the time due to the difficulties with conducting political action of 
any kind in the South.196 A main focus of the CIO PAC was registration and ensuring sufficient 
voter turnout; this crucial element was believed to be a key factor in the conservative gains in 
1942. Over a year before the 1944 election, both the CIO News and the UCAPAWA News were 
running pieces on voter registration in preparation for the upcoming battle.197 Entering 1944, the 
PAC had hosted conferences in several more large cities around the nation, and its treasury was 
flush with over $700,000 from both the CIO and its member unions. Philip Murray reinforced 
the organization’s commitment to supporting the president and his pro-labor policies and allies 
while refraining from taking on the role of a third party.198 The organization placed a large 
emphasis distributing literature encouraging people to become politically active; it also released 
specialized writings and pamphlets targeted towards women and black workers and voters. All 
told from the middle of 1943 through 1944, the CIO PAC distributed nearly 85 million pieces of 
literature around the country.199 The monumental efforts of Hillman and his PAC were supported 
by the activities of member unions like UCAPAWA as they continued to emphasize the 
importance of political action among their members. While the CIO succeeded in defeating 
established politicians even in southern strongholds such as Gadsden, Alabama, the primary 
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concern of the PAC was the presidential election.200 After election day, CIO officials hailed 
FDR’s win and emphasized that the PAC played a crucial role in the proceedings; outside of 
holding the presidency the Democratic Party, most often associated with labor support, also held 
seats in the Senate while gaining twenty seats in the House. Importantly, the PAC was able to 
exert political influence even while being attacked by conservatives as being hopelessly 
infiltrated by communists. The failure of this strategy sits in stark contrast to the events which 
would befall the CIO before the end of the decade.201 
 While many portions of the CIO’s political action program seemingly resonated with 
those around the country, an increased number of strikes in 1944 led to an intensified round of 
hostility against the CIO. This hostility manifested itself increasingly across the South where 
conservative Democrats sought to keep the labor movement away from their states. Beginning in 
1943, a wide range of legislative challenges to unionism were launched by various states. These 
laws were often argued as necessary by conservatives as they were needed to prevent 
racketeering by union officials.202 More often than not, the laws passed in these southern states 
were at odds with federal law and were thus declared unconstitutional after court challenges by 
various unions.203 During the 1944 election, Arkansas, Florida, and California held referendums 
on right-to-work amendments to their respective constitutions. Though the CIO was able to fight 
off the challenge in California, smaller memberships in Florida and Arkansas were unable to 
defeat the amendment which effectively banned the union shop as they “provided that no person 
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could be refused employment because of affiliation or lack of affiliation with a labor union.”204 
As historian Ray Marshall noted, “These laws proved unenforceable but set precedent for the 
state right-to-work laws when they were permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.”205 The early 
days of 1945 did not prove much different than the war years which had proceeded it. In only a 
few short months, however, America would lose its president and claim victory over both 
Germany and Japan. Through August, when the Japanese surrendered to officially end the war, 
strike numbers had remained relatively low. Upon the end of the war, CIO priorities shifted now 
that the union had more flexibility with regard to job actions. The CIO immediately sought wage 
gains for its members, many of whose wages had been stagnated for years due to the WLB’s 
policy of preventing inflation. The CIO also issued a renewed commitment to collective 
bargaining and made unemployment compensation a key priority for the federation. The rise in 
wages accompanied by unemployment security for those newly unemployed after the war, the 
CIO believed, would allow for a smooth reconversion of the postwar economy.206 The smooth 
reconversion was nowhere to be found initially. The UAW, USWA, UPWA, and UE, all unions 
which had experienced tremendous growth and boasted large memberships, struck between 
December of 1945 and March of 1946. All of these unions sought wage gains from corporations 
such as GM and US Steel; these wages were kept low due to the threat of inflation during the 
war, but fact-finding boards appointed by President Truman found that these corporations could 
afford substantial wage increases despite their insistence otherwise.207 The first two months of 
1946 saw over 43 million man-days lost to strike activity with over a quarter of the CIO’s 
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membership on strike as of February 1st. Collectively, these actions would be the largest 
sustained strike action in US history by the time they were brought to a resolution by the raising 
of wage rates.208 The CIO’s largest unions emerged from the war flush with members and 
money. They were determined to use their strength to consolidate and win further gains from 
management. The CIO was determined to weave the strength of its largest national unions 
together with the hundreds of thousands of unorganized workers in the South in order to carve 
out labor’s role in postwar America. These desires would collide with the launching of Operation 
Dixie in 1946 in an event which marked a new era for the CIO. 
Chapter IX. Operation Dixie Begins 
 The CIO, fresh off securing wage gains for many of their members through large, 
disruptive job actions, finally acted on its promise to organize the South during 1946. In March, 
Philip Murray announced the creation of the Southern Organizing Committee (SOC) to affect 
“the organization of low-paid, unorganized workers in the southern states.” Speaking on the 
drive, Murray said, “With wage rates set at the highest level in history, the southern drive has 
become even more important. It will not only bring comparable benefits to the southern workers, 
but will protect the northern, unionized workers from low-pay competition in open-shop 
areas.”209 During the same announcement, Murray promised a one-million-dollar funding 
contribution to the drive from the CIO and its member unions. He also named the members of 
SOC to be headed by Van Bittner, Murray’s long-time lieutenant at both the UMW and USWA, 
as director and George Baldanzi, vice president of the TWUA, as assistant director.210 The 
campaign officially opened on May 3, 1946 in Atlanta, Georgia. This was the site of SOC 
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headquarters and the place from which Bittner coordinated much of the activity of Operation 
Dixie. SOC was active in twelve states: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Each 
state was assigned a state director who would be responsible for the regional directors serving 
under them. A stated minimum of no less than two hundred organizers was planned for the drive, 
and by November there would be more than two hundred and fifty organizers in the field.211 A 
large portion of these organizers would be sent to textile mills across the South in which almost a 
third of southern manufacturing workers toiled. While the textile industry had steadily lost 
workers in the North, the South by 1946 had become the center of American textiles comprising 
about seventy-five percent of all textile workers. Sensing the weakness of unionism in an 
industry where almost an entire region of workers remained unorganized, CIO leaders jumped at 
the opportunity to organize these crucial concerns. Van Bittner himself said, “When you 
organize the textile industry of the South, you have not only the textile industry of America 
organized, but you have practically all industries in the South under the banner of the CIO. So, 
our main drive…has been in the textile industry.”212 From the beginning, opposition to the CIO 
was expected to be stiff. The politicians of the southern states shared many of the same vitriolic 
views of both the southern organizing drive and the CIO more generally. An example of these 
views can be found in a speech prepared by Senator Eastland of Mississippi:  
Mr. President, the Congress of Industrial Organizations has opened a drive to organize the Southern States 
for the admitted purpose of electing to the Congress men who will follow the CIO line to control the 
political affairs of the South, and to dominate the social and economic life of our people. During the past 
few years this organization has grown powerful throughout the nation. It is allied with and works hand in 
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glove with the minority groups of the industrial east, the negro organizations, and various classes of fellow 
travelers.213 
This speech is just one example of the numerous attempts to paint the CIO and its organizers as 
outsiders, foreign to the land, and lacking real desire to help southern people. Alongside these 
charges, accusations of communist affiliation were readily thrown at the CIO, its leaders, and its 
member unions. Political criticism, especially the threats of being labeled communist, forced 
Bittner to tread carefully since the CIO did have significant communist influence in several of its 
member unions. First, Bittner drew approximately eighty-five percent of his staff from the South 
to push back against portrayals of CIO foreigners “invading” the South. Secondly, he 
emphasized that the CIO would not accept the help of outside organizations during its upcoming 
drive, and he also cautioned member unions contributing organizers to the drive not “to try to put 
organizers on our staff you wouldn’t have on your own.”214 Additionally, at Bittner’s urging, the 
CIO Executive Board decided that all state directors for SOC would resign any PAC jobs they 
held. The decision was made to subordinate political interests to organizing during the drive 
because, as Bittner noted, the CIO was “not going to make any political gains in the South until 
we organize the workers.215 These actions had the effect of marginalizing some of the more 
radical and politically conscious elements among CIO organizers; ironically, these left-leaning 
radicals had been the driving force behind many of the CIO gains in the South prior to 1946. The 
CIO as well as Bittner’s personal sensitivity to the communist issue and the subsequent decisions 
made by the Executive Board along with Bittner himself represented a major shift in CIO 
strategy which would have immediate ramifications on Operation Dixie.  
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 Bittner was not similarly cautious about the issue of race, saying, “we made up our minds 
that…we are organizing men and women regardless of creed, color, or national origin, because 
they are God’s human beings and are workers, and we are organizing all workers.”216 Despite 
these strong words which mirrored the egalitarian policy of the CIO, expectations of radical 
racial reordering in the South were tempered from the beginning of the drive. The CIO News 
described, “as Bittner has pointed out, CIO’s sole objective in the south is to organize workers 
into unions ‘for collective bargaining for higher wages and better working conditions.’”217 It was 
clear that while black workers would not be excluded from the organizing campaign, the broader 
social issues intertwined with race in the south would not be touched by SOC. As reported by 
historian Robert Zieger, “continued agitation of racial questions, Bittner told FTA president 
Donald Henderson, ‘is hurting our drive and I am not going to allow anything to interfere with 
the organization of the workers into CIO unions.’”218 In the same way that decisions to 
marginalize the left within Operation Dixie would come to define the strategy of the entire drive, 
the explicit decision to avoid the issue of race whenever possible would shape organizing efforts 
in the South. Once again, Bittner and the SOC leaders chose a conservative path which served to 
limit the influence of some of its most militant, successful southern organizers and members 
during a watershed moment for southern organized labor.  
 Harboring a decidedly conservative strategy and leadership, SOC set about to organize its 
primary concern, textiles, during 1946. Operation Dixie’s focus on textiles has been well 
researched by numerous historians over the years. From the efforts of these historians such as 
Robert Zieger, Michael Goldfield, and Barbara Griffith among others, it has been established that 
 
216 Ibid.  
217 “Time to Re-Tire,” CIO News, May 18, 1946, 4.  
218 Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955, 233-234. 
59 
 
Operation Dixie with regard to organizing the crucial textile industry in places such as North and 
South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama was a failure.219 SOC strategy had dictated that 
some of the largest textile chains in the South such as Cannon Mills in Kannapolis, North 
Carolina, Bibb Mills in Georgia, and Avondale Mills in Alabama were among the first priorities 
for CIO organizers. The CIO leaders hoped that by organizing these large concerns throughout 
the South they could bring back the hope and optimism of 1937 and 1938 when the UAW, 
URW, and SWOC won victories against some of the largest employers in their respective 
industries.220 SOC leaders believed that winning union representation in small plants would be 
insignificant and not provide the desired boost to organizing workers when compared to potential 
victories at the large chains; besides, the sheer number of small textile concerns in the South was 
too great for the CIO to attempt to organize them in a timely, effective manner given their 
relatively small number of organizers spread throughout the region. The decision to concentrate 
on large textile chains would provide no shortage of challenges for CIO organizers. As Barbara 
Griffith wrote of the strategy in her work on Operation Dixie:  
One of the most compelling arguments against it stemmed from the fact that bellwether plants were often 
the only industry in an area and had been built with their own mill towns around them. The level of control 
that owners of such plants exercised over the lives of their workers was much greater than that found in 
towns with more than one employer. The peculiar problems posed by the paternalism of textile mill villages 
added an altogether different dimension to the task of union organizing and more often than not made an 
organizer's job significantly more difficult.221   
Despite the continued assertion from those involved with the southern organizing drive that 
things were progressing well, and gains were being made in the textile industry, the results of 
NLRB elections from the inception of the drive until the end of 1946 bears a much different 
story. Of forty-seven elections conducted among nine different southern states, the TWUA won 
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only twenty-one of these elections. Aggregate numbers show the union was outvoted by 
approximately three thousand “no union” votes during this period, and the elections only covered 
16,000 of the hundreds of thousands of textile workers spread across the South. Even more 
telling was the fact that the CIO could simply not get enough workers to sign membership cards 
at many of the large plants it wished to organize; as a result, workers at many of the large plants 
mentioned above never even participated in an NLRB election.222 William Smith, North Carolina 
state director for SOC, wrote to Bittner after a disappointing run of election results:  
Frankly, I am worried and heartsick about the loss of these two textile elections this week as I realize only 
too well that unless we crack some of the major textile mills in the state, the rest will not mean too much. I 
never wanted to do anything more in my life than to do a real job in the textile industry. The lethargy and 
disinterest of the textile workers is enough to frustrate anyone and frankly, while I have some ideas, I do 
not know the answer to it all.223 
The CIO struggles of late 1946 were not limited to Operation Dixie. In November, 
Republicans won sweeping victories in the midterm elections gaining control of both the House 
and the Senate for the first time since 1930. Conservative gains were driven by reactions to the 
strike wave of 1945-1946, to Operation Dixie and its potential to affect change in the South, and 
to charges that the CIO was run by communists.224 The combination of these forces combined 
with a continuing shift to the political right across the country set the CIO up for failure in these 
elections. The CIO News labeled the day “Black Tuesday” for organized labor whilst describing 
the wide assortment of anti-labor bills which were likely to be considered by the new 
Congress.225 Crushing defeat in these elections served to add insult to injury to the CIO who was 
quietly racking up losses in Operation Dixie. The election was a blow to the organization’s PAC 
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which had earlier in the year lost its leader, Sydney Hillman, in July of 1946. Even prior to 
Hillman’s death, the PAC was forced to fight a constant uphill battle to oppose anti-labor 
legislation and attempt to help elect friends of labor to Congress. Labor suffered a string of 
legislative defeats such as the scuttling of a bill which would create a permanent FEPC, the 
failure to affect the passing of an effective full employment measure, and the dismantling of the 
wartime price control apparatus within the federal government.226 The CIO’s poor legislative 
performance culminated in June of 1947 when the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, was passed over President Truman’s veto. This law 
overhauled the 1935 Wagner Act and had important implications for organized labor and the 
CIO. The law contained a number of provisions making a number of activities illegal such as 
jurisdictional and secondary strikes and union contributions to political campaigns of most any 
nature.227 Taft-Hartley also established a list of unfair union practices which complicated the 
process of collective bargaining and expanded the power of the government and the president to 
prevent or bring an end to strike activities. The CIO Executive Board and President Murray 
issued many forceful rebukes of the law through the CIO News as well as wrote impassioned 
pleas to those in Congress and the White House, but the conservative upswell emanating from 
the 1946 election was simply too strong to keep the legislation from being passed.228 A 
congressional survey commissioned around the time of the passage of Taft-Hartley clearly shows 
that a large majority of both houses of Congress as well as the voting public endorsed the 
provisions of the Act. In many southern states, support for the Act was unanimous among the 
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congressional delegations.229 Confined to these realities, the CIO for the immediate future would 
be forced to deal with the restrictions of Taft-Hartley. Two of the more onerous provisions of the 
Taft-Hartley Act were the section which provided states with the right to pass laws outlawing 
any form of union security measures such as the closed shop and the requirement that union 
officials wishing to deal with the NLRB had to sign non-communist affidavits. As a result of 
these actions, over half of the southern states passed right-to-work laws by the end of 1947.230 
The issue of communist influence within the CIO continued to simmer within the organization; 
this issue, fueled by the introduction of the affidavit requirement, would eventually force CIO 
leadership’s hand later in the 1940s as part of a continued turn towards conservatism within the 
organization. 
Operation Dixie was marred by issues from its very conception. The campaign struggled 
mightily to organize in its stated area of concentration, textiles, and the CIO-PAC suffered 
critical electoral as well as legislative defeats which hampered the overall program of labor 
organization within the southern United States. It would, however, be a disservice to the CIO and 
SOC to assert that it achieved no postwar victories in the South. Rather, the CIO and its member 
unions experienced considerable success throughout the region, and many of these victories 
provided proof of the very same organizing concepts which SOC and its leadership rejected in 
the textile campaign portion of Operation Dixie. Opposed by hostile politicians supported by a 
considerable amount of the populace in the South, CIO organizers nevertheless carried their 
mission to “organize the unorganized” across the southern states in hopes of improving the 
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conditions of exploited southern workers. Beginning in 1946 and shortly after the launch of the 
drive, it was clear that results were to be had in favor of the CIO. In July, the IWA won an 
election at the Masonite Corp. in Laurel, Mississippi; this plant was the largest industrial facility 
in the state at the time employing nearly 2200 employees.231 By September, the IWA had added 
three lumber mills to its Laurel local as well as a further two Natchez, Mississippi concerns. The 
union also made forays into Arkansas where it organized woodworkers in West Helena and 
Mountain Pine. Additionally, the IWA added two plants in Sondheimer, Louisiana to its rolls 
while also recruiting bargaining units in Norfolk, Virginia and Century, Florida.232 Through the 
end of the year, the IWA continued to press its organizing throughout the South. The union 
added to its rolls lumber mills in disparate places such as Diboll, Temple, and Waskom, Texas as 
well as Troy, Evergreen, and Fulton, Alabama. The IWA continued to complement its previous 
gains in Arkansas and Mississippi; new plants were signed up in Benton and Pine Bluff, 
Arkansas while the union saw victory in several elections within the state capital, Jackson, while 
continuing to add plants in both Natchez and Laurel. Additionally, the IWA was able to organize 
a lumber mill in Knoxville, Tennessee, a feat never before completed, prompting Paul 
Christopher, Tennessee state director for SOC, to report that this “opens the way for organization 
of many more workers in this industry in Knoxville.”233 By the time of the one-year anniversary 
of the beginning of Operation Dixie, the IWA could claim a further ten election victories in 
North Carolina with several more yet to be held.234  
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The IWA was not the only CIO union to experience southern success after the launch of 
the southern organizing campaign. The FTA, formally UCAPAWA, had been active in the South 
since its creation in 1937. The union comprised some of the most radical elements of the CIO; 
this is borne out by the union’s approach to building interracial unions across the Jim Crow 
South while remaining committed to combining the principles of industrial unionism with civil 
rights actions. In 1946, the FTA’s reputation was well established. The CIO News reported on 
FTA political activity in Winston-Salem, where a strong union presence in the form of Local 22 
was established during WWII, “mayor of Winston-Salem during the recent primary campaign, 
told a [sic] FTA delegation that they were responsible for the registration [to vote] of 15,000 
Negroes. ‘With all these labor people voting, you can never tell what will come next,’ he 
said.”235 The FTA experienced tremendous success at the beginning of the drive. The union won 
representation elections at cotton compresses and other agricultural concerns across the South in 
Charleston, Jackson, Montgomery, and New Orleans during the early months of the drive. Much 
of the FTA effort during this early period was the organizing of tobacco concerns in Virginia and 
North Carolina. The FTA won NLRB elections in over fifteen North Carolina tobacco plants 
scattered across the state. These plants bolstered the FTA presence in tobacco which had existed 
ever since interracial Local 22 won bargaining rights at R.J. Reynolds during the war while 
inroads were made in Virginia with a winning election at two tobacco production facilities in 
South Boston.236 Throughout their organizing efforts, the FTA continued to support political and 
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Negro leader to appear on a Democratic primary ballot in Texas.” The FTA News praised 
Adams’ accomplishment as well as the large number of Local 75 members who exercised their 
right to vote.237 The FTA, in the midst of its tobacco organizing drive, prepared to release a 
pamphlet highlighting the issue of race and civil rights in attempts to advance tobacco 
organization among black workers. William Smith, North Carolina state director for Operation 
Dixie, immediately objected to the release of this communication. In his letter to FTA regional 
director Frank Green, he says, “While the leaflet contains material that is truthful and can be 
used to good advantage in some situations, I strenuously object to its use in the State of North 
Carolina for the following reasons: 1. It raises a negro nationalistic approach which could easily 
prove dangerous to us. 2. Our campaign in the Tobacco drive is such a huge success that we 
should easily be able to bring it to a successful conclusion without the need of elaborating on the 
racial issue…”238 Smith’s writing is emblematic of the majority view held by most of SOC 
leadership with regard to confronting the racial issue in the South. It also reflects the ways in 
which the conservative SOC attempted to keep its member unions from making direct challenges 
to the racial order of the southern states. 
FTA was not the only union which embodied more liberal beliefs about race compared to 
the SOC. Mine Mill had from its inception welcomed black workers and communists freely into 
their ranks. The union had insisted on forming integrated locals even in staunchly segregated 
Birmingham. With the opening of the southern organizing campaign, Mine Mill took the 
opportunity to further expand its membership in the South. The union acquired significant gains 
by winning several elections in Charleston, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia while also 
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winning NLRB victories in plants in Dublin, Georgia and El Paso.239 The UPWA, its leaders 
known to be of the more radical, left wing persuasion, won elections in Atlanta, Dallas, 
Memphis, and Oklahoma City during the early months of the drive. The elections both served to 
extend representation further into the large companies which the UPWA had already partially 
unionized as well as helped the UPWA to establish a presence at smaller packinghouses.240 The 
United Furniture Workers of America (UFWA) maintained a small presence in the South prior to 
Operation Dixie. Their membership was concentrated among the Carolinas as well as in 
Arkansas and Memphis, Tennessee. The union set about to expand the reach of its membership 
by committing itself to a southern drive at the UFWA convention in June 1946; at this same 
convention resolutions were introduced encouraging cooperation with the Soviet Union as part of 
the WWII “Big Three” and opposing minority discrimination.241 While at odds with the ideals of 
SOC leadership, the facts bear out that these resolutions did not slow down UFWA organizing in 
the South. The union saw a number of gains during 1946 especially in Memphis where the union 
won four elections in rapid succession after the onset of the drive. Across the border in Arkansas 
the union found similar success in early NLRB election victories there.242 Perhaps the greatest 
single success for the CIO’s southern campaign during 1946 came at a large atomic plant in Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee. Following a run-off election between the CIO and the AFL, the CIO won the 
right to represent nearly four thousand workers of the Carbon & Carbide Chemicals Corporation. 
As the CIO News notes, victory was achieved “despite the frenzied efforts of the AFL to paint 
the CIO red [as communists].”243 The success of a number of unions in running organizing drives 
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across the South during the early stages of Operation Dixie stands in stark contrast to the failure 
in organizing the crucial textile industry. Even more surprising is that many of the CIO unions 
which showed the greatest degree of success across the southern states were those which 
harbored left-wing leadership and radical ideas rapidly losing favor among top CIO brass. The 
tensions between these conflicting ideals would continue to simmer over the next few years 
while Operation Dixie clung to life in the South.  
The FTA continued to enjoy considerable success in the South despite the struggles faced 
by Operation Dixie more generally. It opened the year 1947 by winning elections by a greater 
than two to one margin at a cotton oil plant in Greenwood, Mississippi and a tobacco production 
facility in Greenville, Tennessee. During the Greenwood drive, black organizers were often 
threatened by groups of whites in the town. The FTA News detailed the response of one 
organizer faced with these threats:  
This young veteran, a Negro, told them simply that he had given three and a half years in service to 
eliminate fascism, to give people the right to organize into unions of their own choosing and that he was 
going to organize as long as he was alive, and if they wanted to dump him in the river to go right ahead 
because someone else would take his place. When this group saw that they could not scare him or the 
people like him, they were left alone.244 
The FTA continued to organize workers in the face of much hostility. The focus on tobacco 
remained evident as the union secured bargaining rights at seven tobacco production facilities in 
Kentucky, this led to the formation of FTA Local 66, while also winning an election at a plant in 
Nashville. The union also added two food processing plants in Suffolk, Virginia along with a 
cotton compress in Greenwood, Miss. Adding to the FTA’s impressive record, it successfully 
fought off an AFL challenge at American Tobacco Co. in Charleston; once again, the victory 
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was carried despite smear campaigns conducted by both the AFL and the company.245 The FTA 
continued to carry on strong support for political action and subsequently the FTA News reflected 
this in nearly every issue by encouraging readers to become politically involved. The FTA 
further improved its hold on the tobacco industry by organizing another two plants in Farmville, 
Virginia, and it organized another cotton compress in Selma, Alabama.246 By October of 1947, 
the FTA had signed up so many cotton oil and compress workers that a conference on the 
industry was held in Memphis with representatives from plants across the South as well as FTA 
President Henderson in attendance. The conference discussed the prospect of agitating for wage 
gains in the industry, the addition of overtime pay for the workers, and further organizing of 
these plants across the region.247 
 Like the FTA, the UPWA continued to shore up gains in the South while agitating for 
greater political action. Early in 1947, the UPWA won elections at facilities in Vernon and Mt. 
Pleasant, Texas. The union secured additional victories for workers in Albany, Georgia, 
Mayfield, Kentucky, Oklahoma City, and Memphis during the first half of the year.248 During 
1947, the UPWA went to great lengths to establish links between organized labor and farmers 
wherever possible for the purpose of political action. UPWA leadership believed that an effective 
partnership between the two groups could provide a united front against swelling tides of 
conservatism in the United States. The CIO News acknowledged that “these committees have a 
long row to furrow in reviving the traditional liberalism of the American. However, they have 
the keen advantage of a determined will to do the job.249 Alongside the UPWA, the UFWA kept 
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at its organizing in the South. The union won NLRB victories early in the year at large plants in 
Port Smith, Arkansas, Sumter, South Carolina, and Rocky Mount, Virginia.250 Later, the UFWA 
organized a plant in Knoxville, Tennessee before its organizing efforts were hampered by the 
actions of an AFL-affiliated union. This union, the UIU, continually attempted to raid UFWA 
southern locals which forced the UFWA to expend organizing resources to ensure that their 
locals remained intact. UFWA Director of Organization Ernest Marsh released a statement to 
union membership criticizing UIU leaders for claiming to have taken fifty or more shops from 
the union in the Carolinas and Tennessee when in reality the UIU held only three or four shops in 
the entire South. These AFL raiding efforts coupled with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act 
prompted Marsh to release another statement to specifically southern UFWA locals and 
members. Marsh encouraged radical action to overcome the effects of Taft-Hartley and secure 
the organization of the southern furniture industry: “There will be no recognizing of the T-H law 
and we will fight with the old reliable methods used before F.D.R. gave us the Wagner Act. 
From now on we must build real strong, militant locals – we will strike if necessary to win 
recognition or demands or if forced to do so by bosses who are trying to break our Unions. This 
all means that greater solidarity must be built up in our own UFWA Locals and among the 
various CIO Unions.”251 
 During 1947, the IWA continued to organize workers across the South in both cities and 
far-flung rural lumber concerns. In the east, the IWA secured election victories at several plants 
in Portsmouth, Virginia and Elizabethtown and Norman, North Carolina during the first half of 
the year. In rural Arkansas, the union won an election at a large plant in Warren. They followed 
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this up by organizing and winning elections at lumber mills in Fayette and Yazoo City, 
Mississippi as well as yet another victory at a large mill in Laurel.252 As the year progressed, the 
IWA was active in Louisiana, where they won elections at mills in Ponchatoula, Thibodaux, and 
an especially large mill in Tallulah. The union continued to maintain a presence in the larger 
cities by organizing mills in both Memphis and Dallas during the latter half of the year. The IWA 
had a series of late year victories amid the flourishing timber industries in North Carolina and 
Georgia; three mills were organized in Albany and Dawson, Georgia while a further two NLRB 
victories were won in Fayetteville and Elizabeth City, North Carolina.253 Along with its 
organizing progress, the IWA encouraged political action among its members much like the 
FTA. The CIO News ran a story on the significance of IWA political action in Dierks, Arkansas. 
In 1945, IWA Vice President Bill Botkin visited the small, newly formed local at Dierks, which 
was at the time a solid company town, and gave the union members small encouragement for 
political action. As the story reads, “Recently, Botkin passed through Dierks again. He found that 
they had elected the union president mayor and won every other post except one minor 
office.”254 This is just one example of CIO political action bringing real, tangible change to the 
lives of its working membership through the winning of political office. As noted, however, 
many of the CIO’s largest unions as well as the SOC committee neglected to encourage political 
action in the South during Operation Dixie due to the conservative ideals of the leadership.  
 Mine Mill was another of the CIO member unions who insisted on encouraging political 
action among workers. In 1947, however, the opposing factions of conservatives and liberals 
within the union threatened to tear it apart. The January reelection of Reid Robinson, a known 
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left-wing radical, as Mine Mill president spurred a movement to secede among more 
conservative elements of the union.255 Threats to union stability reached such a fever pitch that 
by March the CIO Executive Board was offering to mediate the situation. The Executive Board 
intervened to bring some 24,000 members back into the union, and they were also successful in 
getting Mine Mill to agree to a special election to resolve the internal dispute.256 Despite the 
election of a new president, Mine Mill leadership remained overwhelmingly left-wing, the 
leadership refused to sign non-communist affidavits required by Taft-Hartley, and the competing 
tensions within the union would continue to simmer.257 Even with internal strife threatening the 
union, leadership was able to create a Mine Mill PAC for the purposes of initiating a program for 
the 1948 elections. The PAC was to focus on energizing the rank-and-file membership of Mine 
Mill for political activity. Once again, this sort of activity ran counter to the wishes of the SOC, 
but it provided a political avenue to entice workers to join the union in addition to purely 
economic measures.258 For Mine Mill, a union which had long been interested in political 
activism and militant unionism, the establishment of a PAC to invigorate its own membership 
seemed a natural evolution for the union.  
 1948 was a decisive year for the CIO and its unions. The federation was forced to reckon 
with the impact of Taft-Hartley among a growing swell of anti-communist ideals within the CIO. 
The government only fueled these tensions by its decidedly anti-communist attacks on CIO 
unions. The Senate Labor-Management Relations Committee released a report condemning the 
powerful FTA Local 22 in Winston-Salem for, among other things, “excessive political activity 
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which has nothing to do with employee interests or with collective bargaining,” “soliciting and 
collecting contributions for the CIO, PAC and for other organizations and movements known as 
communist or subversive in their natures,” and “promoting the political fortunes of a Negro 
alderman.” It should be noted that CIO President Murray came to the defense of the FTA by 
asking the chairman of the committee, Republican Joseph Ball, to “repudiate” the report; 
Murray’s defense of the FTA in this instance would stand in stark contrast to many of his future 
actions with regard to FTA and other left-leaning unions in the CIO.259 Further difficulties came 
for the FTA as a result of the affidavits required by Taft-Hartley. FTA leadership’s refusal to 
sign the affidavits meant that the union could not appear on NRLB ballots. As a result, AFL 
unions seized on the opportunity to raid FTA membership from its locals. Thus, FTA resources 
during 1948 were tied up in attempting to defend their membership from these raiding actions 
and further organizing efforts were less effective.260 The FTA clashed with the national CIO over 
two crucial events during the year. First, the FTA wholeheartedly endorsed Henry Wallace’s 
third party bid for the presidency. Second, the union refused to endorse the Marshall Plan and 
instead offered their own plan for aid to Europe. Both actions ran counter to explicit direction 
from CIO leadership to deny support to third party candidates as well as to support the Marshall 
Plan.261 In their opposition to CIO policy, the FTA was joined by Harry Bridges, UE president 
Albert Fitzgerald, the Fur and Leather Workers’ Union, the UFWA, NMU and CIO general 
counsel Lee Pressman among others. By March, Bridges had been relieved of his duties as CIO 
regional director for California and Pressman resigned from the CIO to “be free to engage in 
such activities as working for the election of Henry A. Wallace.” SOC director Van Bittner, 
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speaking on the issue of support for Wallace, said, “…was really the first open fight between the 
trade unionists and the communists and in the end I am sure it will do the CIO a lot of good.”262 
The UFWA joined FTA in supporting Wallace and denouncing the affidavit requirement of Taft-
Hartley. As with the FTA, the failure to sign non-communist affidavits resulted in the raiding of 
union locals by AFL unions and even some CIO member unions. International President Morris 
Pizer sharply criticized this raiding activity within the labor movement and implored national 
CIO leadership to put a stop to the practice. Much like the FTA, organizing new locals in the 
South became much more difficult as resources were prioritized to defend established locals 
from raiding.263 Following in the steps of the two aforementioned unions, Mine Mill endorsed 
Wallace’s campaign for president and also refused to sign the non-communist affidavits. The 
policies of Mine Mill leadership once again brought factionalism within the union to a head. 
Locals released public statements disagreeing with Mine Mill Board policy, and a group of 
twenty-four locals comprising nearly 20,000 members bolted from the union with plans to 
affiliate with the UAW.264 The events of 1948 were, unfortunately for these unions, only a 
precursor to further anti-communist attacks in 1949 and 1950.  
 In contrast to the three unions mentioned above and following the line of the majority of 
the CIO member unions, the UPWA and IWA complied with the signing of non-communist 
affidavits and adhered to CIO policies opposing political third policies. These unions, free to 
participate in NLRB elections, were far less susceptible to raiding from other AFL and CIO 
unions, and they were still able to make organizing gains during this period. The IWA was able 
to secure the union shop at one of its large plants in Laurel while at the same time winning 
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elections at new plants in Greenville, Hattiesburg, Yazoo City, and Meridian. The woodworkers 
once again entered Texas, Tennessee, and North Carolina to win elections at new concerns in 
Nacogdoches, Memphis, and Washington, respectively. In Alabama, the IWA added nearly five 
hundred workers to its rolls in Brewton by winning elections among all three divisions of a large 
lumber mill. NLRB victories at mills in Columbus and Buena Vista, Georgia followed by 
victories in two union shop elections covering nearly 1400 workers in Louisville, Kentucky 
rounded out the year for the IWA.265 Whereas previously the IWA had maintained only a select 
number of locals in the South, the union could claim almost 12,000 members represented in the 
region by the end of 1948.266 The UPWA followed the IWA’s example of a turn towards 
conservatism and yielded to signing the Taft-Hartley affidavits; the union’s leadership also 
repudiated support for Wallace and third party candidates generally.267 Despite being 
preoccupied with a prolonged strike during the first half of the year, UPWA managed to secure a 
number of southern NLRB victories. The UPWA added three plants in Birmingham to its 
membership; an additional four victories were claimed in Fort Worth and Dallas with one 
election covering almost 1600 workers. Organizing was not limited to these larger cities, 
however, as the UPWA also won elections in Elk City, Oklahoma, Tifton, Georgia, and 
Chattanooga, Tennessee before the year was out.268 1948 was a year of poor fortunes for the 
CIO’s most radical, leftist member unions, but the troubles would only intensify with the coming 
of the new year.  
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Chapter X. No More Communists 
 By 1949, reactionary forces had raised the communist alarm to its highest levels in the 
United States. Raiding of CIO unions by both AFL and other CIO member unions had been 
occurring since 1947 and was a serious problem for the left-leaning unions; in December of that 
year, Local 207 of the ILWU based in New Orleans, an interracial local with a decidedly 
communist leadership, lost its 1700 workers to the CIO United Gas, Coke, and Chemical 
Workers because of the refusal of the leadership to sign the non-communist affidavit.269 As 
previously mentioned, UAW, led by Walter Reuther as president, had raided Mine Mill locals 
and summarily brought almost 20,000 new workers into the union during 1948. In 1949, the CIO 
Executive Board endorsed UAW raiding of the much smaller Farm Equipment Workers (FE) due 
to its leadership’s refusal to sign the non-communist affidavit or accept a forced merger with the 
UAW.270 Similarly, the FTA was tasked with defending itself from raids by other unions, both 
AFL and CIO, but the organization lacked an effective mechanism to defend itself since its 
leadership would not sign the affidavits required by Taft-Hartley. Appeals to stop union raiding 
were sent from the FTA convention in 1949 to both the AFL and CIO, but these appeals could 
not find listeners over the roar of anti-communism. Even the resignation of President Henderson, 
who was subsequently hired as administrative director to get around signed the non-communist 
affidavit, could not appease the CIO.271 The UFWA also struggled against the spectre of anti-
communism. UFWA Local 282 in Memphis organized a strike among seven hundred black 
women in the summer of 1949. The strike, according to Rebecca McKinley who worked at the 
plant, was over wages and working conditions at the Memphis Furniture Company. The strike 
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was beaten through company use of scabs as well as the actions of CIO officials in Memphis. 
The head CIO man in the city, William Copeland, was a staunch anti-communist and was also an 
opponent of integration. Copeland helped to set up a committee to investigate communism 
within Local 282 as well as FTA Local 19.272 This committee ultimately purged Local 282 and 
Local 19 of many of the most militant black workers as well as the most progressive white 
members of the unions. As historian Michael Honey notes, “the removal of white leftists robbed 
the Memphis CIO of interracial strike support, and strikes indeed began to fail. The loss of the 
strike against the Memphis Furniture Company coupled with the loss of some of its most 
effective organizers provided for the destruction of the UFWA’s largest local before the end of 
1949.”273 Mine Mill perhaps experienced the most dramatic union raiding of any of the left-wing 
unions. Its integrated Birmingham locals, representing over 4000 workers, were a prime target of 
USWA locals in the area. The USWA encouraged white Mine Mill members to revolt and leave 
their unions since they were more likely to oppose the communist tilt of the union and its 
egalitarian principles. The Ku Klux Klan intimidated black unionists during the build up to the 
election, and attacks between Mine Mill leadership and Phil Murray grew increasingly personal 
as violence escalated in and around Birmingham. In May 1949, the USWA emerged victorious in 
an election and took control of the Mine Mill locals in the Birmingham area.274 The loss of these 
Mine Mill locals meant that one of the most radical, militant CIO unions had lost its foothold 
even in an area where it had previously thrived, and this only provides further evidence as to the 
radically conservative turn of the CIO in the late 1940s.  
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 The FE and the UE had already severed ties with the CIO before the end of 1949 over the 
communist issue. Late in the year at the CIO convention resolutions were adopted which 
“authorized the Executive Board by a two-thirds majority to refuse to seat anyone ‘who is a 
member of the Communist Party . . . or who consistently pursues policies and activities directed 
toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party.’ Moreover, the 
delegates shouted through a companion resolution empowering the board to expel any affiliate it 
deemed to have been following policies ‘consistently directed toward the achievement of the 
program or the purposes of the Communist Party.’”275 In the early months of 1950, charges were 
brought against the American Communications Association, FTA, Fur and Leather Workers, 
Mine Mill, United Office and Professional Workers, United Public Workers, ILWU, Marine 
Cooks and Stewards, and the International Fisherman’s Union based upon the above resolution. 
Trials were prepared, but they could not be expected to be impartial since all members of the trial 
committees were avowed anti-communists. Eventually, all of these unions would be expelled 
from the CIO in 1950 despite the defiance and best efforts of their leaders. In removing these 
unions from the CIO, the federation had voluntarily forfeited nearly a fifth of its total 
membership.276 Meanwhile, the UFWA only escaped expulsion from the CIO by removing the 
communists from leadership positions within the union. While persecuting whole unions, the 
CIO also called on member unions to root out “traitorous elements of a foreign government.” 
Jack O’Dell, WWII veteran, NMU member, and Operation Dixie volunteer organizer, fell victim 
to one such purge within his own union when he was expelled on June 26, 1950.277 Discontent 
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with simply expelling the unions, CIO officials actively worked against the FTA after it left the 
CIO. Local 22 in Winston-Salem, the largest FTA local comprising some 10,000 white and black 
workers, was the primary target of the CIO. The first election, in March 1950, was forced into a 
runoff between Local 22 and “No Union” while the CIO and AFL members attempting to raid 
the local failed to reach this stage. At first, it appeared Local 22 had held up under pressure by a 
razor thin margin; however, the NLRB awarded 133 challenged votes to the “No Union” camp 
which caused Local 22 to lose the election. The loss of the massive local crushed the FTA and 
resulted in a merger with several other small unions to form the Distributive, Processing, and 
Office Workers of America (DPOW).278  
Chapter XI. Final Days of Operation Dixie and the CIO 
 Operation Dixie took a backseat to the expulsion of communist dominated unions which 
occurred in 1949 and 1950. Van Bittner, director of the Southern Organizing Committee, died on 
July 19, 1949. He was succeeded as president briefly by George Baldanzi before John Riffe 
supplanted him in this position.279 SOC had pulled out of Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana by 
the end of 1948; Alabama would join these states as abandoned in 1949. Sporadic organizing 
would continue around the region from 1949 on, but the overall CIO commitment to the effort 
was marginal at best.280 Baldanzi, a vice-president of TWUA, regularly clashed with President 
Emil Rieve after Baldanzi’s brief stint as SOC director. The two men lobbed accusations relating 
to the poor performance of the TWUA in the South. A failed 1951 TWUA strike at the Dan 
River mills in Virginia which cost the union nearly 1.3 million dollars was the last straw for 
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Baldanzi and his supporters. He opposed Rieve at the 1952 TWUA convention, but Baldanzi and 
his fellow supporters running for office were summarily defeated. Not two weeks later, Baldanzi 
joined the United Textile Workers of America (UTWA), an AFL union, as director of 
organization. Baldanzi himself holds that the TWUA lost around four hundred local officers and 
nearly 50,000 members when his supporters joined him in the UTWA.281 This split in the textile 
industry only made further gains harder to come by in what had already been an uphill battle.  
 After the expulsion of its communist dominated unions, the CIO as a national concern 
grew more and more interested in politics. Leadership saw the legislative and political areas as 
useful places to advance the interests of their union membership. The federation also pushed for 
an embrace of social Keynesian economics which would ensure continued economic growth for 
the country. The CIO, especially after its support for Truman in the 1948 election, grew closer 
and closer to the Democratic Party. Throughout the early 1950s, the CIO supported Democratic 
senators and representatives with the hope of advancing portions of their legislative agenda such 
as the repeal of Taft-Hartley.282 Many CIO unions, formerly prone to wildcat strikes and 
spontaneous actions by the rank-and-file membership, began to become more stable in the 1950s. 
The establishment of strong bureaucratic structures coupled with effective leadership proved able 
to slowly lessen the impact of these actions, actions which ironically had fueled the rise of the 
CIO less than two decades earlier.283 In November 1952, two actions occurred which had 
massive implications on the CIO’s future. First, Republican Dwight Eisenhower was elected 
President of the United States. Second, on November 9, Philip Murray, who had been the CIO 
president for over a decade, died. The election of a conservative president combined with the 
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death of its venerable leader put doubts on the CIO’s ability to continue. Out of a closely 
contested election, Walter Reuther, veteran UAW official and current president, ascended to the 
CIO presidency. Shortly after his rise to the presidency, Reuther set up the Organizing Policy 
Committee (OPC); the function of this committee was to discontinue any CIO directed 
organizing projects. The OPC also closed forty-three of the CIO’s fifty-six regional offices. 
Among the causalities of the reordering was the Southern Organizing Committee; thus, 
Operation Dixie came to a rather unceremonious end in early 1953 when compared to the fanfare 
which kicked off the campaign in 1946.284 Determining the final balance of Operation Dixie is 
made rather difficult due to a lack of reliable statistics about union membership. For example, 
SOC claimed in November 1948 that the drive had brought 450,000 new members into the 
union, but NLRB elections, which the CIO almost always used to secure new membership, 
tallies from 1946 to 1952 show only 276,969 votes for the CIO, making it incredibly difficult to 
discern the exact numerical gains with accuracy. After the expulsion of the communist unions 
from the CIO, raiding of their former locals became more commonplace than the organizing of 
new concerns. Competition with the AFL also burdened CIO organizers throughout the region. 
Many of the CIO’s member unions added numbers to their rolls during Operation Dixie, but by 
1953 the CIO had lost ground to the AFL in percentage of total southern membership. Thus, 
while there were CIO gains during the drive, factionalism among the unions, competition from 
the AFL, the difficulties organizing in the South, and initial difficulties left the drive drifting and 
without a clear purpose in its latter years.285 Ultimately, the CIO’s grand project to remake the 
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South and the nation fell short, but the drive still constituted a major undertaking which had no 
precedent at the time of Operation Dixie’s beginning.  
 After Reuther’s election to the CIO presidency, factionalism once again reared its head 
within the federation. David McDonald, Murray’s former lieutenant, claimed the USWA 
presidency after Murray’s death. With the USWA and UAW being by far the CIO’s two largest 
unions, McDonald was a natural rival to Reuther after the latter rose to the CIO presidency. 
McDonald engineered the placement of USWA official John Riffe, former head of SOC, as CIO 
executive vice president to ensure a level of control despite Reuther’s place as president.286 With 
institutional instability and Reuther’s primary commitment to the UAW, much of the 
responsibility of organizing was dispersed among the individual CIO member unions during 
1953 and 1954. With fervor for industrial unionism at a low point following the post-Korean war 
recession, Reuther began to look towards merger with the AFL as a serious and indeed, an 
inevitable conclusion. He was spurred on by McDonald who threatened to take the USWA out of 
the CIO unless a merger with the AFL could be had. Though unity discussions had occurred 
periodically between the AFL and CIO since 1937, the lack of CIO interest by Reuther, 
McDonald’s insistence on merger, and the declining fortunes for the labor movement in the 
postwar era more generally combined to create a perfect storm in 1955. Joint unity committee 
discussions began in October of 1954. On February 9, 1955, Reuther and George Meany, AFL 
president who ascended to the office around the same time as Reuther, signed the basic 
agreement which would bring the labor federations together.287 Negotiations on the specifics of 
the merger continued throughout the year, and by December everything was in place to complete 
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the merger. The CIO held its final convention on December 1-2, 1955; when it came time to vote 
on the merger, only Michael Quill and the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) that he 
headed opposed the action.288 On December 5, 1955, the AFL and the CIO united and the 
American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was founded 
in New York City.289 The grand project that was the CIO ceased to exist as an independent 
organization, but the power afforded to the unified federation ensured that it would survive until 
the present day, championing labor and the worker along the way.  
Conclusion 
 Even though the CIO only existed as an independent entity for less than twenty years, the 
body had an outsize effect on the American labor movement. The CIO, headed by John Lewis, 
came onto the scene in 1935 with a mandate to “organize the unorganized” especially in the mass 
production industries which were heretofore ignored by the AFL. Its early organizing successes 
in the 1930s were fueled by revolutionary, militant tactics such as the sit-down strike. The CIO 
espoused egalitarian ideals within its ranks and valued the rank-and-file membership during 
these early days precisely for their radicalism and militant activities. In the South, the CIO was 
one of the earliest large organizations to confront the specter of segregation head on. Through the 
early days of the CIO, radical members who were willing to take action against management 
were valued for their organizing skills and for their refusal to compromise their ideals. Often, 
these radical progressives pushed hard for anti-discriminatory stances in official CIO policies 
and many of the white workers among them strove to improve the stations of their black and 
Hispanic peers. When World War II began, any prerogatives on the part of the radical members 
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of the CIO were pushed aside in the name of national unity. Returning to a peaceful domain, the 
same radical, militant members of the CIO found themselves in a disadvantageous position. The 
marginalization of the left which occurred with the onset of the Cold War drove a wedge 
between the CIO as it was in the midst of Operation Dixie. National leadership, insistent upon a 
conservative course of action, sought to deemphasize the earlier values of shop floor militant 
unionism combined with a strong civil rights agenda. Disaster resulted for the CIO; many of its 
strongest southern locals collapsed without interracial support. Without radical organizing 
support, new workers were harder to sign up and the gains made in earlier years in many places 
erased as a result of the conservative onslaught. The CIO was forced into a merger with the AFL 
after its grand experiment in industrial and civil rights unionism came to an end in 1955. 
 Despite reintegrating with the AFL, the CIO maintains a separate legacy in its own right, 
especially with regard to southern organizing. When the CIO first made organizing forays into 
the South, the federation was often the first real, tangible opportunity for black workers to 
improve upon their conditions in many areas. One party political domination, Jim Crow laws, 
and the fiery racial attitudes of the southern United States made it incredibly difficult to organize 
black workers. The CIO and its member unions, with the benefit of a tradition of radicalism and 
militant action existing in areas across the South, spent years organizing black workers, 
encouraging them to become active politically, and fighting alongside them to win better rights. 
This legacy of civil rights unionism did not die with the AFL-CIO merger. In the years since the 
CIO ended its mission to organize Dixie, the spirit of those early activists, progressives, and 
militant union members has survived. In 1960, as historian Timothy Minchin notes, four African 
American students used a sit-in at a white-only lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, 
“initiating the direct action phase of the southern civil rights movement…Within two months, 
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similar sit-ins had taken place in fifty-four cities in nine southern states.”290 According to George 
Holloway, now a member of the UAW, as he reflected on his time in the unions, “The United 
Auto Workers and two other labor unions were the ones that contributed the money and the 
people to make the 1963 civil rights march in Washington, D.C., a success. Most people don’t 
know these things.” He later added, “I’m a living example of UAW justice. I learned about 
kindness and fairness in the labor movement. I learned about truthfulness and justice in contracts. 
I have my UAW flag, and I saved it to be put on my casket, just like Walter [Reuther]’s was.”291  
These actions for civil rights culminated in the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act which 
among many other significant developments established the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to ensure compliance with non-discrimination. In February 1968, a 
spontaneous strike of all black Memphis sanitation workers began in response to poor working 
conditions, job hazards, and poor pay. They struck to secure union recognition, and they were 
supported by a broad community coalition as well as legendary civil rights activist Martin Luther 
King, Jr. King’s last public address was to a crowd assembled in support of both the striking 
workers and racial justice; he was assassinated in Memphis the next day. The tragedy of King’s 
death spurred ever more support for the sanitation workers, and they won the union recognition 
they sought. Eventually, the sanitation local would grow to become the largest union local in the 
city of Memphis, and its efforts would inspire public employees to unionize across the South.292 
This success came in the same city where Edward “Boss” Crump had proudly proclaimed that he 
would keep “nigger unionism” out of Memphis prior to the massive successes CIO experienced 
organizing the city. Similarly, African American hospital workers struck in 1969 to protest 
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working conditions and low wages. The hospital administration and politicians of the state 
opposed the strike vigorously while the workers enlisted the help of the civil rights movement in 
their campaign.293 Traditions of black worker activism were unleashed which could be traced all 
the way back to the FTA’s own Charleston Local 15. In Laurel, Mississippi, where the CIO had 
established a strong presence during Operation Dixie, a 1979 strike at a Sanderson Farms poultry 
processing facility lasted for nearly six months. In preparation for an anticipated strike, the 
international union had sent young, black organizers in to replace the older, white representatives 
at the majority African American plant.294  
Even today, the spirit of CIO organizing lives on in the South. In Bessemer, Alabama, 
just sixteen miles outside of Birmingham, a massive union drive is due to be decided by NLRB 
votes on March 29. The Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union (RWDSU), originally 
chartered by the CIO in 1937, is leading the effort to bring the union to an Amazon fulfillment 
center employing over 5000 workers. In Bessemer, where over a quarter of the population lives 
below the poverty line and seventy-one percent of those people are African American, it is easy 
to see why this facility would have been high on the CIO’s list. A victory would be a watershed 
moment for the labor movement; it would be the first union to gain recognition at Amazon in the 
United States.295 Much has changed since the CIO and its unions roamed the South looking to 
organize workers, but the basics of union organizing in the South have not. The hostile political 
structure, defiant management, and the issue of race remain. The legacy of CIO success in 
defeating these elements to improve life for workers can be seen in the union drive at Amazon 
and it will continue to inspire and motivate southern workers for years to come. As Amazon 
 
293 Ibid, 112-113. 
294 Marc Miller, Working Lives: The Southern Exposure History of Labor in the South, 291-295. 




worker and union organizer Jennifer Bates says, “So many times we walked away when we 
could have helped somebody, and said, ‘I’m gonna save myself and the rest of y’all can sink if 
you want to,’ but this one right here was one of those where I said, ‘You know what, I’m not 
running. I’m not running.’ For years, I’ve seen people are being mistreated. I’ve seen people just 
get fired. When is it gonna stop?”296 
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